Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court erred in preventing Defendant from presenting evidence of other shootings taking place at the residence for the limited purpose of cross-examining crime scene investigators who testified about the manner in which the shooting in this case occurred, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court erred when it did not give a limiting instruction regarding evidence indicating that Defendant had committed other crimes or civil wrongs, but the district court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the district court did not commit prejudicial error in the remainder of its rulings challenged by Defendant. View "State v. Burnett" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under fourteen years old. The district court accepted Defendant’s no contest plea. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant sought to withdraw his plea. The district court denied Defendant’s motion and proceeded to sentencing. Defendant appealed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred by failing to inquire regarding an alleged conflict of interest between Defendant and his counsel and by failing to appoint conflict-free counsel to represent Defendant at the motion to withdraw plea and sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea and vacated the sentence, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant and his counsel alerted the trial court to a potential conflict between them, and the district court erred by failing to inquire further into the nature of that conflict; and (2) Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was not provided conflict-free counsel to assist him in arguing his motion to withdraw his plea. Remanded. View "State v. Prado" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated battery, abuse of a child, and child endangerment. The Supreme Court remanded for resentencing. After Defendant was resentenced for his rape conviction, he appealed, challenging whether the district court on remand could order the rape sentence to run consecutive to his other sentences. The court of appeals determined that Defendant’s sentence was not reviewable on appeal because the new sentence was within the presumptive range under the Kansas Sentence Guidelines Act (KSGA). The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal because appellate jurisdiction exists to determine whether the district court had authority to impose a consecutive sentence, even if that sentence fell within the presumptive range; (2) running the new rape sentence consecutive to the other sentences was a permissible mechanism under the KSGA for the district court to regulate the sentence’s length; and (3) a district court may designate that the sentence for the primary crime of conviction runs consecutive to the defendant’s other sentences under the KSGA’s multiple-conviction sentencing statute. View "State v. Morningstar" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child under fourteen. The district court sentenced Defendant in accordance with Jessica’s Law to two consecutive life sentences with no possibility of parole for approximately ninety-one years. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior misconduct, (2) did not place an unconstitutional condition on Defendant’s defense, and (3) did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a psychiatric evaluation of the complaining witness. The Court affirmed Defendant’s sentence with the exception of the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, which was vacated because it was erroneously imposed. View "State v. McCune" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder, first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. In a separate penalty phase, the same jury sentenced Defendant to death for the capital offense and to a consecutive controlling sentence of life without the possibility of parole for fifty years on the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions with the exception of his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, which the Court vacated because it was multiplicitous with Defendant’s capital murder conviction; and (2) vacated Defendant’s death sentence, holding that the district court failed properly to instruct the jury on its duty to consider mitigating circumstances. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Gleason" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape. The district court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after adjudging him an aggravated habitual sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction but vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding (1) the district court erroneously admitted statements Defendant made in a pretrial notice of alibi, but there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict; and (2) the Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Turner required that Defendant be sentenced as a persistent sex offender rather than as a habitual sex offender. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

In State v. Bunyard, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be convicted of rape if intercourse begins consensually but consent is withdrawn after penetration and the intercourse continues by force or fear. Bunyard held that a defendant is entitled to a “reasonable time” in which to act after consent is withdrawn and communicated to the defendant. In this case, Defendant was found guilty of rape. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. Citing Defendant’s testimony that he briefly continued the intercourse after the victim withdrew consent, the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to give a Bunyard instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court disapproves of Bunyard’s “reasonable time to withdraw” language and its definition of “reasonable time”; (2) when a defendant is charged with rape for an offense committed before July 1, 2011 and the evidence suggests the victim initially consented but withdrew consent after penetration, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the elements of rape and give an additional instruction on withdrawn consent; and (3) the additional withdrawn consent instruction was warranted in this case, and the district court’s failure to give it was not harmless. View "State v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with crimes arising out of an incident in which she accompanied her boyfriend and his cousin to the apartment of the victim and fatally shot the victim. Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in giving a no-sympathy jury instruction; (2) the district court did not reversibly err in refusing to supplement the pattern jury instruction on aiding and abetting; (3) Defendant’s claim on ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before the Court; and (4) Defendant’s claim of cumulative error failed. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant and three other individuals were prosecuted for the murder of one victim and the assault of another. One defendant entered into a plea agreement, and the other three were convicted at separate jury trials. Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to convict Defendant of felony murder and aggravated burglary; (2) being an aider and abettor for a crime is not an alternative means of committing the crime, separate and distinct from committing the crime as a principal; (3) the trial court did not err in giving a pattern felony-murder instruction to the jury; and (4) the narrowed jury instructions on the elements of felony murder and aggravated burglary were not erroneous. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated trafficking. Defendant appealed, raising numerous challenges to his conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the aggravated trafficking statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad; (2) Defendant lacked standing to assert that the aggravated trafficking statute was unconstitutionally vague; (3) the charged offense of aggravated trafficking is not identical to the offense of promoting prostitution; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing arguments; and (5) the district court did not err in increasing Defendant’s sentence based on prior convictions not proven to a jury. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law