Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant entered a no contest plea to one count of violating the Kansas Offender Registration Act. Appellant’s intensive supervision officer later filed a warrant alleging that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation. After a probation revocation hearing, the district court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his prison sentence. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 asserting that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the probation revocation hearing. The district court denied the motion. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the prior panel had already rejected Appellant’s arguments and that the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellant’s present claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by applying the doctrine of res judicata to bar Defendant’s claim; but (2) the claim was meritless, and therefore, the lower courts did not err in denying Appellant’s motion. View "Grossman v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). During his August 2011 sentencing, the district court imposed the enhanced sentence applicable to a person with four prior DUI convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567(j), which was effective July 1, 2011, all of his pre-July 1, 2001 DUI convictions should have been excluded for sentence-enhancement purposes. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s enhanced sentence, concluding that the shortened look-back provision of the new law was a substantive change that could not be applied retroactively. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the number of prior DUI convictions applicable to the current DUI sentence is to be calculated at the time of sentencing on the current conviction, and the shortened look-back period in Kan. Stat. Ann. 1576(j)(3) should have applied to Defendant’s August 2011 sentencing. View "State v. Reese" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her vehicle conducted incident to a traffic stop. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the pretextual nature of the stop rendered the seizure constitutionally invalid. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed on other grounds, holding that the law enforcement officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that justified the search. The dissenting member of the panel argued that the case should be reversed and remanded for additional findings as to whether a reasonable suspicion existed, as an appellate court cannot engage in factfinding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was properly suppressed, as (1) an appellate court conducts a de novo review of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists; (2) the undisputed facts and the district judge’s findings of fact were sufficient for appellate review of the totality of the circumstances; and (3) based on that review, the court of appeals correctly found that the search in this case was invalid because the circumstances did not establish a reasonable suspicion that justified a search of the vehicle. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reexamined the holding in State v. Alexander that a defense of dwelling jury instruction should not be given in a trial where the person defending a dwelling is the alleged victim rather than a defendant. In this case, the trial judge gave the pattern instructions regarding defense of a dwelling and defense of self but also inserted a sentence in the defense of dwelling instruction that informed the jury that “self-defense is not available to someone who is being forced out of a dwelling by an individual who is lawfully defending the dwelling.” Applying the instructions, the jury convicted Defendant of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the defense of dwelling instruction should be given when necessary to inform the jury regarding the legal principles that govern the case, even if it is the alleged victim who defended his or her dwelling, rather than the defendant; and (2) the trial judge did not err in giving the pattern instructions regarding defense of a dwelling and defense of self, but the addition to the pattern instructions misstated the law; however, the error was harmless. View "State v. Andrew" on Justia Law

Appellant, a persistent sex offender involuntarily committed to Larned State Security Hospital, filed three petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Without requiring responses from the Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services and without conducting hearings, the district court dismissed the petitions, concluding that Appellant’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies precluded habeas corpus relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 2012 legislature expressly exempted habeas corpus proceedings from the exhaustion requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a24, and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the petitions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Stanley v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and aggravated burglary. Utilizing Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4635, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for fifty years for Defendant’s murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a hard fifty sentence because section 21-4635, the hard sentencing statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, vacated his hard fifty sentence, and remanded for resentencing, holding that section 21-4635 violates the Sixth Amendment because it imposes additional punishment based on factors not submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Holt" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The district court found aggravating circumstances to impose a hard fifty life sentence on Defendant’s first-degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding (1) certain statements made by the prosecutor, although arguably misconduct, were very mild and made in response to defense counsel’s argument; (2) any error in failing to provide a second-degree murder instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) cumulative error did not deny Defendant a fair trial; and (4) in accordance with State v. Soto, Defendant’s hard fifty sentence was unconstitutionally imposed by the district court in violation of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Roeder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 216 months’ imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed on direct appeal. Defendant subsequently filed the present pro se motion for postconviction relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in three distinct ways. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by denying Defendant’s 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing, as the motion, files, and records failed to show conclusively that Defendant was not entitled to relief. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant’s allegations. View "Sola-Morales v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated interference with parental custody and disorderly conduct. The court of appeals found several trial errors, including two instances of prosecutorial misconduct and three jury instruction errors, but concluded that the errors did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated interference with parental custody and affirmed her conviction for disorderly conduct, holding (1) two of the trial errors, both of which related to Defendant’s defense of ignorance or mistake, warranted the reversal of Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated interference with parental custody; and (2) the prejudice Defendant suffered as a result of these errors did not taint her conviction for disorderly conduct, nor did any other claimed errors. View "State v. Ortega" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. After the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of four aggravating factors, Defendant received a hard fifty life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant appealed, raising nine issues challenging his convictions and two challenging his sentences. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions, thus rejecting Defendant’s claims of reversible error; and (2) vacated Defendant’s sentence for first-degree murder, holding that Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as interpreted in Alleyne v. United States, was violated because the judge, rather than the jury, found the four aggravating factors existed and did so on a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, rather than a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.View "State v. Hilt" on Justia Law