Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated sexual battery. The district court sentenced Defendant to thirty-four months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual battery and that the court erred in failing to appoint new, conflict-free counsel at a hearing on his pro se motion to dismiss counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had the lesser included offense instruction regarding sexual battery been given; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that he was entitled to new counsel. View "State v. Pfannenstiel" on Justia Law

In State v. Ford, the Supreme Court held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504 is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging a conviction based upon an alleged violation of the competency to stand trial statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3302. In this case, Defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence a decade after he was convicted of felony murder and the sale of cocaine. In his motion, Defendant claimed, for the first time, that he had not been competent to stand trial, and therefore, the district court’s failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing and stay his prosecution rendered his convictions and sentences void for lack of jurisdiction. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the holding in Ford controlled this case, and therefore, pursuant to Ford, Defendant may not utilize a motion to correct an illegal sentence to challenge the trial court’s alleged failure to comply with section 22-3302. View "State v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a mandatory term of fifty years for the first-degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a potential juror’s statements; (2) Defendant did not preserve his argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress an eyewitness identification; (3) the district court did err by denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial and his motion for a new trial based on the eyewitness’ changed testimony at trial; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a weapon and the results of scientific testing conducted on it despite any deficiency in the chain of custody; and (5) the district court’s instruction to the jury to consider the degree of certainty demonstrated by the eyewitness when identifying Defendant was not clearly erroneous. The Court, however, vacated Defendant’s hard fifty life sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that Defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation of his constitutional right to a jury trial, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

After a second mistrial, Appellant was convicted of sex-related crimes. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion alleging ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and direct appeal counsel. The district court ultimately granted the motion and reversed the conviction. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant entered an Alford plea on different charges. In exchange, the State dropped the original charges. Between entering into the plea agreement and sentencing, Appellant filed this legal malpractice action against trial and appellate counsel and the Board of Indigents’ Defense Services (BIDS). The district court ruled that BIDS lacked the capacity to be sued, that Appellant’s Alford plea foreclosed the relief sought, and that Appellant’s claim was time barred. The Court of Appeal agreed with the district court with the exception of the statute of limitations issue, ruling that Appellant’s claim was timely filed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly found that BIDS is not subject to suit in a legal malpractice action; (2) Defendant may pursue this legal malpractice claim without first demonstrating actual innocence of the charged crimes; and (3) this suit was timely filed under the applicable statute of limitations. View "Mashaney v. Bd. of Indigents' Defense Servs." on Justia Law

After a joint trial with his co-defendant, Defendant was convicted of one count of premeditated first-degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to life with a minimum term of fifty years. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the hard fifty life sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a potential juror’s statements; (2) the district court did err by denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial based on a witness’ testimony; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; (4) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to sever his trial from his co-defendant’s trial; (5) the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case was not clearly erroneous; but (6) Defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation of his constitutional right to a jury trial, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions. After review was granted by the Supreme Court, Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court erred in classifying his 1993 Kansas convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery as person felonies, resulting in a longer sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the definition of drug paraphernalia; and (3) Defendant’s 1993 Kansas convictions must be classified as person offenses based on the classification in effect for those crimes when Defendant committed his current crimes of conviction. View "State v. Keel" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers stopped Defendant’s vehicle for displaying an improper license. An officer had Defendant, the driver, and his passenger exit the vehicle and searched the vehicle, which led to the seizure of a wallet from inside the vehicle. The wallet contained Defendant’s identification, which led to the discovery that Defendant’s driver’s license was revoked. The officers placed Defendant under arrest and conducted a pat-down search that produced cocaine from Defendant’s pants pocket. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing that his arrest was illegal and the subsequent search incident to arrest was invalid as fruit of the poisonous tree. The court of appeals affirmed on procedural grounds, noting that the district court did not have an opportunity to consider and rule upon the search and seizure challenge that Defendant presented on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ refusal to entertain the merits of Defendant’s arguments, holding that defense counsel’s stipulations in the district court prevented the evidentiary inquiry necessary to produce the factual findings below that would permit appellate consideration of Defendant’s fruit of the poisonous tree theory without speculation as to what the facts might have been. View "State v. Estrada-Vital" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI). The charge was based upon a 2002 DUI diversion and a 2004 DUI conviction. Defendant filed a motion to strike the diversion from consideration of his criminal history and a discharge from the felony charges. The district court granted the motion and excluded Defendant’s 2002 DUI diversion from his criminal history. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Defendant’s 2002 DUI diversion could properly be counted as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes because Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach during the 2002 diversion proceedings. The court also found that although Defendant had a statutory right to counsel during the diversion proceedings, the diversion agreement that Defendant signed showed that he had validly waived this statutory right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counting Defendant’s 2002 diversion as a prior DUI conviction for purposes of classifying and sentencing him for his current DUI conviction did not violate his constitutional or statutory right to counsel, as (1) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel never attached during the diversion proceedings; and (2) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory right to counsel during the DUI diversion proceedings. View "State v. Tims" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated escape from custody. The district court sentenced Defendant to nineteen months in prison, basing the sentence in part upon Defendant’s criminal history score of A, which it calculated by classifying two of his 1986 Kansas juvenile burglary adjudications as person felonies. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly classified Defendant’s prior burglary adjudications as person crimes for criminal history purposes because the classifications required judicial fact-finding that went beyond merely finding the existence of a prior adjudication or the statutory elements of the prior adjudication. Remanded. View "State v. Cordell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State violated Defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial, but the error did not require reversal; (2) the district judge did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; (4) the district judge did not err by denying Defendant a mistrial or a new trial based on improper testimony by State witnesses, as Defendant failed to establish substantial prejudice warranting a new trial in the interest of justice; and (5) cumulative error did not necessitate reversal. View "State v. Brownlee" on Justia Law