Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony murder and aggravated robbery. More than seven years later, Defendant appealed his sentence and filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. The district court rejected Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea on the merits and ruled that Defendant failed to demonstrate the excusable neglect required to permit his untimely motion. The district court also rejected Defendant’s big to appeal out of time, concluding that it was untimely and not otherwise subject to exceptions from the statutory time limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the appeal as untimely or in denying Defendant’s untimely motion to withdraw plea. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated arson, and aggravated endangerment of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting portions of the State’s pretrial motion to introduce certain out-of-court statements made by the victim; (2) excluding evidence that the victim had attempted or contemplated suicide in the past; (3) refusing to admit evidence that a hormone that the victim may have been taking had a side effect of depression; (4) excluding Defendant’s testimony about the victim’s use of marijuana; and (5) overruling Defendant’s objection to a prosecution witness’s reference to Defendant’s narcissism during cross-examination. View "State v. Seacat" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated battery of his thirteen-year-old daughter, C.H. Defendant appealed, arguing that insufficient evidence supported his rape and aggravated criminal sodomy convictions. Defendant later filed a pro se petition pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512 seeking postconviction forensic DNA testing of certain items. The district court denied the petition after a nonevidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s denial of Defendant’s petition was founded upon its application of incorrect legal standards. Remanded. View "State v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded no contest to first-degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of one count of attempted murder and one count of aggravated arson. After unsuccessfully seeking to withdraw her plea before sentencing, Appellant filed four Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motions collaterally attacking her conviction. The motions were denied. Appellant subsequently filed two postsentence motions to withdraw her plea. The district court denied both motions. Appellant appealed the denial of her second successive motion. Appellant conceded that this motion was successive to others she filed and lost. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that there was no showing of excusable neglect because the motion was successive. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. The district court imposed a hard twenty-five sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in excluding the proffered testimony of a witness as to the victim’s prior specific bad acts of violence; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation; (3) even if the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the error was harmless; and (4) the State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

While Defendant was serving a nonprison sentence of probation with community corrections supervision in three cases, the State filed a motion to revoke Defendant’s probation. After a hearing, the district court stated that it would reinstate Defendant on probation with a ninety-day sanction. The court, however, reopened the completed probation revocation hearing based upon Defendant’s subsequent contemptuous act, found Defendant in direct contempt of court, and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation was based on a ground for which Defendant was not provided sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard in violation of Defendant’s due process rights. Remanded for a new probation revocation hearing. View "State v. Hurley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff retained Defendant, a criminal defense attorney, to represent him in a probation revocation proceeding. The district court eventually accepted Plaintiff’s stipulation to violating probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve his originally imposed prison term. An error in the journal entry of sentencing, however, led to Plaintiff serving more time in prison than his original sentence. Plaintiff filed a petition for legal malpractice against Defendant. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment, but the district court set aside the default judgment and dismissed the lawsuit because Plaintiff had not established his innocence under the exoneration rule. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the district court erred in setting aside the default judgment for excusable neglect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-260(b)(6) ; but (2) erred in dismissing the lawsuit based on the Court’s holding in Mashaney v. Board of Indigents’ Defense Services with respect to the exoneration rule and the running of the statute of limitations. View "Garcia v. Ball" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of abuse of a child, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, aiding and abetting aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and promoting obscenity to a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting Defendant’s female cousin’s testimony about past sexual abuse as propensity evidence; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence at trial as to each element of the crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a child; and (3) the district court erred in finding a witness was unavailable to testify at trial and admitting her preliminary hearing testimony, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Page" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated burglary. Defendant’s lawyer subsequently filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial judge denied. Defendant also filed a pro se motion, which the district judge construed as a motion for new trial. In his motion, Defendant argued, in relevant part, that his lawyer had failed to put on evidence in Defendant’s defense. Characterizing Defendant’s arguments as allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district judge concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the court of appeals said that Defendant could challenge his trial counsel’s effectiveness through a later motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507. Defendant subsequently filed a section 60-1507 motion, arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective in several respects. After an evidentiary hearing, the district judge denied Defendant relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) conflict existed between Defendant and his lawyer at the hearing on the motion for new trial; and (2) Defendant’s remaining allegations were without merit. View "Fuller v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of domestic battery, which was treated as a person felony based on Defendant’s criminal history. The district court imposed the minimum ninety-day confinement required by statute, followed by twenty-four months of probation. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a district court may impose up to sixty months of probation on persons convicted of felony domestic battery in accordance with Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6608(c)(6). Defendant appealed, arguing that he could only be sentenced to twelve months of probation pursuant to the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the absence of a statutory limit, the duration of the probation term for felony domestic battery is a probation condition within the district court’s discretion; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve twenty-four months of probation. View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law