Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

More than a dozen years after Appellant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of manufacture of methamphetamine, Appellant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the court failed to provide lesser included offense instructions for felony murder and because the charging document was fatally defective. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither of Appellant’s claims was properly raised through a motion to correct an illegal sentence, and even if the Court were to construe Appellant’s motion as a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507, it was untimely. View "State v. LaMae" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested under suspicion of driving while under the influence and taken to a law enforcement center. Defendant refused to provide a breath sample for testing, so a law enforcement officer applied for and received a warrant to search Defendant’s blood. Defendant was subsequently charged with refusing to submit to testing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, among other offenses. Defendant appealed, challenging the constitutionality of section 8-1025. The district court dismissed the charge against Defendant that alleged a violation of section 8-1025, finding that the statute violated Defendant’s due process rights and violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the holdings in State v. Ryce, which stated that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional, are equally applicable to Defendant and resolve his case. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence and transported to the county jail, where he refused to submit to a death test. The State charged Defendant with refusing to submit to testing for the presence of alcohol or drugs, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025(a). The district court dismissed the section 8-1025 charge, concluding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical test for alcohol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 does not withstand strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interests and therefore violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Ryce" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. He was taken to the county jail, where he read an implied consent advisory advising him of the consequences if he refused to consent to a breath-alcohol test. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of his breath test results, contending that his consent to the test was not voluntary, and therefore, the test violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. The district court concluded that Defendant’s consent to the breath test was not freely and voluntarily given. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s consent was involuntary because it was obtained by means of an inaccurate and coercive advisement and, therefore, the district court correctly suppressed Defendant’s breath-alcohol test results. View "State v. Nece" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, refusing to submit to an evidentiary test under Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1025, and related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or suppress evidence, arguing that section 8-1025, which criminalized his refusal to submit to a breath test, was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that section 8-1025 was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and also imposed an unconstitutional condition on the privilege to drive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 8-1025 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional. View "State v. Wycoff" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder. Before sentencing, the district judge ruled that Defendant qualified for Stand-Your-Ground immunity from prosecution on the attempted second-degree murder charge. The judge vacated the second-degree murder conviction and dismissed that charge. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s immunity order and reinstated Defendant’s attempted second-degree murder conviction, holding that the district judge had no legal basis for his unilateral decision. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reinstate Defendant’s attempted second-degree murder conviction because the district judge had entered a judgment of acquittal on the charge; and (2) a district judge may sua sponte grant Stand-Your-Ground immunity to a criminal defendant after a jury has returned a guilty verdict but before sentence on the conviction has been pronounced. View "State v. Barlow" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary. Defendant appealed, arguing that his conviction should be reversed because the homeowner was not in the dwelling when Defendant entered it. The court of appeals affirmed based upon existing caselaw that the victim does not have to be in the dwelling at the time a defendant enters it, so long as the victim arrives before the defendant leaves. The Supreme Court reversed the aggravated burglary conviction and overruled the line of cases that the court of appeals relied on as they relate to the crime of aggravated burglary when the defendant is only charged with unauthorized entering into a building or residence and another person is not present at that time, holding that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the aggravated burglary conviction. View "State v. Daws" on Justia Law

In Case 1, Defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor theft and three counts of forgery. In Case 2, Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine. In Case 3, Defendant pled guilty to eight counts of forgery and four counts of theft by deception. Before sentencing in Case 3, Defendant filed a motion for correction or modification of his sentences in Case 1 and Case 2, arguing that his pre-Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA) convictions for aggravated burglary and robbery had been improperly classified as person felonies. Following State v. Keel, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s pre-KSGA convictions were correctly classified as person felonies. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error by the district court in answering a jury question with a written response in violation of Defendant’s right to be present at all critical stages of his trial was harmless; (2) Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument that the submission of a written answer to the jury question violated his right to an impartial judge and public trial; and (3) the district court did not commit clear error in failing to give a jury instruction on a lesser included severity level for the crime of aggravated battery. View "State v. Cooper" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal threat. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in instructing the jury on criminal threat by including two intended victims of Defendant’s threat, as naming two victims of a criminal threat does not state alternative means; and (2) the district court instructed the jury on alternative means to commit criminal threat based on two different mental states, and the State had the burden of providing sufficient evidence of both means, but sufficient evidence supported each of the alternative means instructed. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law