Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder and vacated his sentence for the conviction but affirmed his child endangerment convictions, holding that the district court erred in refusing to give a self-defense instruction, and the error was not harmless.Defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of child endangerment, theft, and possession of marijuana in connection with four separate events. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's first-degree murder conviction, holding (1) the district court erred in refusing to give a self-defense instruction because the instruction was both legally and factually appropriate, and it cannot be said that the failure to instruct on self-defense did not affect the outcome of the trial; and (2) the State provided sufficient evidence to support Defendant's child endangerment convictions. View "State v. Holley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea as untimely, holding that any error on the part of the lower courts was harmless.Defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and abuse of a child. Defendant later filed a pro se Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion attacking his convictions and moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea as untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred when it held that a showing of manifest injustice is a condition precedent to a finding of exclusable neglect; and (2) this error was harmless. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder and his hard twenty-five sentence, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the underlying crime of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle; (2) the district court properly admitted certain challenged testimony; (3) the felony-murder jury instruction was legally appropriate; and (4) because there was no error, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply to deny Defendant a fair trial. View "State v. Levy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of voluntary manslaughter and first-degree premeditated murder, holding that the district court erred in admitting certain expert testimony, but the error was not reversible.The Supreme Court reversed a prior jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of capital murder. Following a new trial on remand, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of his ex-girlfriend and of first-degree premeditated murder in the death of their one-year-old son, holding that the district court erred by admitting the expert testimony, but the error was not reversible. View "State v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction and reversed the judgment of the district court based on the jury verdict, holding that the prosecutor misstated both the law and the evidence during trial and that the prosecutorial errors substantially prejudiced Defendant and deprived him of a fair trial.Defendant was convicted of one count of making a false claim to the Medicaid program for having submitted inaccurate time sheets as part of his employment with a home health-care agency enrolled with Medicaid. The district court ordered Defendant to pay $13,077 in restitution. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated the restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that two errors committed by the State during closing argument deprived Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Watson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in this case and held that the aggravated indecent liberties statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5506(b)(1), is not vague or overbroad and does not violate equal protection as applied.The State charged A.B., who was then a fourteen-year-old girl, with aggravated indecent liberties with a child for having sex with a then fourteen-year-old boy. The State first charged A.B. with unlawful voluntary sexual relations under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-5507, commonly known as the "Romeo and Juliet" statute, but the district court dismissed the charge because A.B. was a few months younger than the boy. In doing so, the court relied on In re E.R., 197 P.3d 870 (Kan. 2008), which held that the statute requires the offender to be older than the victim. The State then recharged A.B. with the more severe crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under section 21-5506(b)(1). The district court subsequently declared section 21-5506(b)(1) unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) section 21-5506(b)(1) is not vague or overbroad and does not violate equal protection; and (2) E.R. which held that section 21-5507 requires the offender to be older than the other participant in the sexual relations criminalized by the statute, is overruled. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on multiple drug charges, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence seized during a traffic stop.At issue on appeal was whether the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop to ask questions about two items that were hanging out of a partially opened safe on the rear floorboard of the vehicle Defendant was driving. In denying Defendant's motion to suppress the district court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the court of appeals properly concluded that the law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. View "State v. Cash" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of attempted capital murder, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated burglary, holding that there were no errors in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for independent DNA testing; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for new appointed counsel; (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for standby counsel; and (4) the State did not violate Defendant's due process rights under Brady by failing to disclose evidence of fingerprint testing. View "State v. Breitenbach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction DNA testing, holding that the district court did not err.In 1993, Defendant was convicted of the second-degree murder of his wife. In 2009, Defendant filed a motion seeking postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512, which authorizes individuals who have been convicted of first-degree murder or rape to petition for such testing. The district court denied the motion because Defendant was convicted of neither offense. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in Cheeks I, concluding that Defendant's exclusion from section 21-2512 violated his equal protection rights. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court decided State v. LaPointe, 434 P.3d 850 (2019), which overruled Cheeks I. Relying on LaPointe, the district court against denied Defendant's motion for postconviction testing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LaPointe is binding precedent and overrules Cheeks I. View "State v. Cheeks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree murder, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Defendant failed to establish good cause and denied his motion to withdraw plea.In his motion to withdraw his plea, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a voluntary intoxication theory of defense because Defendant had told counsel that he was on antidepressants at the time of the murder. The trial court denied the motion, finding counsel's investigation of Defendant's medication legally sufficient to support a finding of competent representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "State v. Barber" on Justia Law