Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Corinthian Bricker pleaded no contest to one count each of aggravated battery, driving under the influence, and failure to present proof of insurance. Contrary to the plea bargain agreement that recommended sentencing to Labette Bootcamp Probation, the district court sentenced Bricker to prison. Bricker then filed a motion to withdraw plea, alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to learn Bricker was ineligible for Labette. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court affirmed, holding (1) defense counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the admission criteria of Labette was not sufficient to meet one prong of Strickland v. Washington test, which states that defendant must show counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's failure to advise Bricker that he could file a pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea was insufficient grounds to warrant post-sentence withdrawal of the plea. View "State v. Bricker" on Justia Law

Appellant William Albright missed the deadline to file an appeal of his conviction and sentence to the Court of Appeals. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for a waiver of the deadline in his case because he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellantâs counsel missed the deadline, and the district court dismissed his appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court should not have dismissed Appellantâs case because his appointed counselâs performance was indeed ineffective. The Court reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits of Appellantâs appeal.

Appellant Jerry Sellers was convicted on two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and received a consecutive 72-month prison sentence on one count, and a 59-month sentence on the other. The district court judge held that Appellant was subject to a lifetime of post-release supervision and a lifetime of electronic monitoring. Appellant raised several issues on appeal, notably, that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a lifetime of post-release monitoring. This monitoring, he argued, was unconstitutional. On review of the lower courtâs record, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not preserve his challenge to the constitutionality of the lifetime post-release sentence under state law. However, Appellant was not subject to the post-release supervision because the State failed to prove he was subject to it. Accordingly, the Court vacated the post-release supervision portion of Appellantâs sentence, and remanded the case for re-sentencing to a 36-month post-release term.

Darwin Williams was convicted in 1987 of two counts of indecent liberties with a child pursuant to state law and sentenced to five to twenty yearsâ imprisonment. In May, 1998, Williams was paroled, but six months later, his parole was revoked because of drug use. After serving more time in prison, Williams was paroled in June 2002, but that parole was revoked six months later. The basis for the second revocation was explained at trial when the Stateâs expert read from a portion of the Department of Correctionsâ Clinical Services Report (CSR). The CSR indicated that Williamsâ parole was revoked âfor having sexual contact with a minor, consuming alcohol, unsuccessful discharge from a Sex Offender Treatment Program, and admitting to viewing pornographic/sexually explicit materials.â As Williamsâs prison term neared its end, the State filed a petition requesting the civil commitment of Williams as a sexually violent predator. The district court determined that probable cause existed for the allegation and sent Williams to a State hospital for evaluation. The district court also appointed a psychologist to perform an independent evaluation pursuant to state law. At trial, experts gave conflicting opinions regarding whether a mental abnormality or personality disorder made Williams likely to repeat acts of sexual violence. After hearing the testimony, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was a sexually violent predator. The appellate court examined the sole issue raised by Williams on appeal: whether there was sufficient evidence to support the requirement under the state Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) that he was âlikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violenceâ in that âthe personâs propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.â The appellate court found that the evidence was insufficient and reversed the district court. The Supreme Court on review found the evidence was sufficient to conclude a reasonable person could find that the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was a sexually violent predator, and affirmed the district courtâs decision.