Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to reckless aggravated battery. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw plea, arguing that holding him to his plea would be manifest injustice. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court may have relied upon State v. Ford, whose insistence on an allegation of innocence in a presentencing plea withdrawal motion had been rejected by the Supreme Court; and (2) his prior convictions were used improperly to increase his sentence because they were not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was unclear whether the district judge relied upon that part of Ford that had been disapproved; and (2) Defendant's second argument had no merit. Remanded for a new hearing to consider Defendant's motion under the appropriate legal standard. View "State v. Garcia" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder for the shooting death of Raymond Gutierrez. The trial court imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that Defendant's tenth grade education was obtained through special education classes rather than regular classes, as Defendant did not offer any evidence or testimony that completion of the tenth grade in special education classes as opposed to any other classes had any bearing on his behavior; and (2) any error in the admission of Defendant's statements to police officers the night of the shooting was harmless. View "State v. Cline" on Justia Law

This appeal arose under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA). A civil jury declared Robert Ontiberos a sexually violent predator and determined he should be committed for treatment until he was safe for release. The court of appeals vacated the commitment and remanded for a new trial because it held that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State's attorney committed misconduct during the trial. The panel rejected Ontiberos' claim that the KSVPA was unconstitutional. Both sides petitioned for review with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because due process guarantees a person facing civil commitment under the KSVPA a right to counsel at trial, and because that person may challenge the effectiveness of his or her trial counsel on direct appeal or under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1501, Ontiberos' constitutional claim lacked merit; but (2) Ontiberos' trial counsel was ineffective, and the State committed misconduct. Remanded for a new trial. View "In re Care & Treatment of Ontiberos" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery after he and two other individuals participated in the armed seizure of one vehicle and the attempted armed seizure of another vehicle. Defendant contended that the district court and Court of Appeals erred in requiring him to register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act because the definition of an "offender" under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4902(a)(7) did not include unarmed accomplices such as himself. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The district court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the language of the statute, an unarmed accomplice is required to register as an offender under section 22-4901(a)(7). View "State v. Nambo" on Justia Law

Defendant James Mossman appealed from the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision following his conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant contended lifetime postrelease supervision constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence to lifetime postrelease supervision under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), holding that the sentence was not disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime, was not grossly disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Kansas or similar crimes in other states, and was not categorically unconstitutional. View "State v. Mossman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy, both class B felonies. Under the indeterminate sentencing scheme then in effect, class B felonies required a minimum prison term of between five and fifteen years and a maximum term of twenty years to life. Because Defendant had a prior conviction, the court sentenced Defendant to thirty years to life on his rape conviction and ten to forty years for his aggravated criminal sodomy conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Later, the district court summarily denied Defendant's pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district district court did not err in summarily denying Defendant's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel; and (2) Defendant did not receive an illegal sentence. View "State v. Heronemus" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of burglary of a nonresidence, criminal damage to property, and obstruction of a legal duty. The strongest evidence against Defendant was an eyewitness' identification of Defendant as the burglar. On appeal Defendant raised two issues related to the eyewitness' identification. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) a prosecutor can commit prejudicial misconduct when respondent to comments by defense counsel, but under the facts of this case, any misconduct committed by the prosecutor in commenting about the eyewitness' credibility was harmless; and (2) Defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that a contested instruction on eyewitness identification was clearly erroneous. View "State v. Marshall" on Justia Law

As required by Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), the district court in this case sentenced Defendant, in part, to lifetime postrelease supervision for his convictions of three counts of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the lifetime postrelease supervision sentence was not disproportionate to the seriousness of Defendant's crime, was not grossly disproportionate to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Kansas or similar crimes in other states, and was not categorically unconstitutional; and (2) the district court did not have discretion to sentence Defendant to a postrelease supervision term of twenty-four months, as there was no reasonable doubt that the Legislature intended that the more severe penalty of lifetime postrelease supervision must be imposed when a defendant is sentenced for a sexually violent crime. View "State v. Cameron" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years on each count to run concurrently. The court did not order restitution at sentencing. After Defendant filed his notice of appeal, the district court entered an order establishing restitution. Defendant appealed, contending that restitution be ordered before imposition of sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to impose restitution after imposing sentence; and (2) Defendant's argument that the sentencing court erred in including lifetime electronic monitoring in the journal entry of judgment was moot because the error was corrected in an amended journal entry of judgment. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the felony murder of his son and of the child abuse of two of his other children. Edgar was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Edgar's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective during closing argument. The district court summarily denied the motion. A panel of the court of appeals reversed without discussing the second prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, instead remanding for an evidentiary hearing. The State appealed, claiming that the court of appeals erred when it did not consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Chamberlain test. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the district judge's denial of Defendant's motion, holding (1) the court of appeals could and should have reviewed the district judge's ruling on the second prong of the Strickland/Chamberlain test, but (2) under the Court's review, the district judge correctly concluded that Defendant failed to establish prejudice. View "Edgar v. State" on Justia Law