Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was sentenced to serve two consecutive twelve-month probation terms for her convictions in two separate criminal cases. During the first term, the district court revoked both probations and ordered Appellant to serve her underlying prison sentences. Appellant appealed, claiming that the second probation term had not commenced when she violated the terms of the first probation term, so that the district court erred in sending her to prison on the second case. Appellant completed serving her prison terms before the case could be heard on appeal, and the court of appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. Finding that the issue raised by Appellant was one capable of repetition and of importance, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals to reinstate the appeal. View "State v. Hilton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by imposing lifetime postrelease supervision instead of parole and by imposing electronic monitoring as a parole condition. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Appellant's convictions; (2) vacated that portion of Appellant's sentence imposing postrelease supervision for the rape conviction, as the district court should have only sentenced Appellant to a life sentence with no parole for twenty-five years for the conviction, not lifetime postrelease supervision, and remanded to the district court for a nunc pro tunc order to correct a portion of the journal entry to delete reference to electronic monitoring, as the sentencing court did not have authority to impose such parole conditions; and (3) affirmed the remainder of Appellant's sentence. View "State v. Beaman" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm for shooting and killing Keith Peters after Keith attempted to break up a fight between two rival gangs. Appellant appealed, asserting that the district court erred in (1) instructing the jury it could consider his gang membership, (2) giving an outdated eyewitness identification instruction he requested, and (3) failing to give a lesser included offense instruction, despite his request that the instruction not be given. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in giving a limiting instruction regarding gang evidence; and (2) the doctrine of invited error precluded Appellant's remaining challenges. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Following his plea of guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, Appellant was sentenced to 216 months' imprisonment. The court also granted a downward departure to thirty-six months' probation to be served at a community corrections residential center. Less than a week after completing the residential portion of his probation, Appellant violated his probation. After a hearing, the court revoked Appellant's probation and reimposed Appellant's original sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in stating that statutory restrictions limited its authority to impose a lesser sentence, which was an incorrect legal standard. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Ardry" on Justia Law

This appeal followed a district court's denial of a defendant's motions for new trial based on postconviction DNA testing that was allowed under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512. The postconviction DNA testing produced some results that were favorable to the defendant, some results that confirmed evidence at trial, and some results that were inconclusive because the small amount and the degradation of the DNA prevented DNA matching. Weighing the mixed results of this evidence, the district court concluded there was not a reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed after noting that an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when the issue on appeal is whether a district court erred in ruling on a motion for new trial based on favorable postconviction DNA test results, holding that reasonable people could agree with the district court that the postconviction DNA test evidence was not so material as to make it reasonably probable there would be a different outcome if there were a new trial. View "Haddock v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an audio recording of a 911 call made by the murder victim's wife; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of seven uncharged burglaries allegedly committed by Defendant for the purposes of proving identity and plan under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455; (3) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct; (4) the sentencing court appropriately imposed a hard 50 sentence; and (5) the hard 50 sentencing scheme is constitutional. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction on several grounds. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated indecent liberties because (1) the State presented no evidence that Defendant engaged in any lewd fondling or touching of the complainant or himself, done or submitted to with the intent to arose or satisfy the sexual desires of the complainant, Defendant, or both; and (2) the State failed to present any evidence, much less sufficient evidence, that Defendant "submitted to lewd fondling or touching" as specified in the jury instruction. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

In the recent case of State v. Bogguess, the Supreme Court held that the lack of an objection during a bench trial that consisted solely of stipulated facts did not preclude appellate review of the pretrial denial of a defendant's motion to suppress. The instant case raised the question of whether the Bogguess holding applies when the bench trial is conducted by a different judge than the one who made the pretrial suppression ruling. The Court concluded that having more than one judge involved in the proceedings did not alter the two-fold rationale of the decision in Bogguess. In this case, the defendant's objection to evidence was preserved, and the court of appeals erred in concluding it was not. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Probationer was entitled to jail time credit toward a sentence for the time she spent in a residential drug abuse treatment facility when her sojourn had not been ordered as a condition of probation in the case where that prison sentence had been imposed. Probationer was statutorily required, and ordered as a condition of probation, to complete drug abuse treatment in the case involving a conviction for cocaine possession. But drug treatment was not statutorily required, or ordered as a condition of probation, in the case where her convictions concerned nondrug offenses. Probationer failed to complete her mandatory drug treatment, and the district court revoked her probation in both cases. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have awarded Probationer jail time credit toward her nondrug offense case's sentence for her time spent in drug abuse treatment. Although the treatment was ordered only as a condition of probation in Probationer's cocaine possession case, there was no statutory requirement that the time spent in such treatment be ordered in the same case in which the jail time credit was sought. Remanded. View "State v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for stabbing her long-time friend multiple times in the head with a steak knife during an altercation inside of Defendant's home. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court should have, sua sponte, given instructions on no duty to retreat, use of force in defense of a dwelling, and a lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in omitting the no duty to retreat instruction in this case, Defendant failed to establish the requisite level of prejudice; (2) the defense of dwelling instruction was not applicable to the facts of this case, and it was not clearly erroneous to fail to give that instruction; and (3) it was error not to give the lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery, but the failure to give the unrequested instruction was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law