Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Douglas Girard and Eugene Mallard were both convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The State filed petitions for their continued confinement as sexually violent predators, a designation that required proof that Defendants were likely to commit repeat acts of sexual violence because of a mental abnormality or personality disorder. Defendants urged the court to apply the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phamaceuticals, Inc. test to the actuarial risk assessments used by the State's expert witnesses in helping to predict the odds of Defendants reoffending. In both cases, the district court ruled that Frye v. United States applied to the actuarial risk assessments and admitted the scientific opinion testimony based partially on these statistical calculations of risk. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that neither Frye nor Daubert applied because the actuarial assessments were not scientific. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds, holding that Frye applied in this case and that the actuarial risk assessments survived Frye's scrutiny. View "In re Care & Treatment of Girard" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for touching the faces, hair, arms, and legs of two young girls, who were playing outside a movie theater. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence of a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), which provides that aggravated indecent liberties with a child is engaging in any lewd fondling or touching of a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the touches did not tend to undermine the children's morals and were not so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Ta" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) it was error for the district judge not to give a second-degree intentional murder instruction, but Defendant's failure to object or otherwise call the judge's attention to this error in the district court placed upon him a burden he could not bear, as the judge's failure to so instruct was not clearly erroneous; (2) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his aggravated kidnapping conviction; (3) the district court did not err in its instruction on aggravated robbery; and (4) the Kansas hard 50 sentencing scheme was constitutional. View "State v. Haberlein" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two criminal charges. The court placed Defendant on probation, but his probation was subsequently revoked. Defendant appealed, arguing that his attorney's position as the guardian ad litem for the victim of one of Defendant's crimes created a per se conflict of interest that denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation proceeding. Relying on State v. Jenkins, Defendant argued this conflict so offended his rights that reversal was automatic and he was not required to show the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation. The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mickens v. Taylor, the court held (1) Defendant had to show the multiple representation had an adverse effect on the attorney's representation because Defendant did not object to the multiple representation; and (2) Defendant did not meet his burden and was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mickens overrules portions of Jenkins; (2) the lower court correctly concluded that Defendant must establish that the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation; but (3) this determination cannot be made on the record on appeal. Remanded. View "State v. Galaviz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1989 of aggravated sodomy, indecent liberties with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child. More than a decade later, while Petitioner was still imprisoned on these convictions, he was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2005, Petitioner petitioned for discharge or transitional release. Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to show probable cause that his mental abnormality had changed to the extent that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a de novo standard of review applied to the court's denial of Petitioner's petition; (2) Petitioner bore the burden of proof in this case; and (3) Petitioner here failed to establish the requisite probable cause entitling him to a full evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge or transitional release. View "In re Burch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving while suspended (DWS). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district court violated his due process rights and his right to present his defense by interfering with a defense witness' decision to testify, (2) DWS is an alternative means crime, and (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the alternative means of committing DUI and DWS. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not substantially interfere with a defense witness' choice to testify or violate Defendant's constitutional right to present a defense; (2) DWS is not an alternative means crime; and (3) Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567(a) does not contain alternative means of committing DUI, and the State presented sufficient proof to sustain Defendant's conviction for DUI. View "State v. Suter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district judge erred in admitting evidence of other crimes and in giving a cautionary accomplice witness instruction over a defense objection, (2) the prosecution engaged in misconduct requiring reversal, (3) the cumulative effect of these errors required reversal, and (4) his convictions and sentences were multiplicitous. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the disputed evidence and in instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor's repeated references to the "truth" during closing argument did constitute misconduct, but the error was harmless; (3) and Defendant's multiplicity argument was without merit. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, concluding that evidence of an attempt to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the State charged him with alternative means of committing DUI, the jury was instructed on both means, and the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish both means on which the jury was instructed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' determination that the phrase "operate or attempt to operate" in Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1564(a) creates alternative means of committing a crime, thus holding that the State is not required to prove both sets of factual circumstances; and (2) affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the State presented sufficient proof that Defendant operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. View "State v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of DUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the State charged him with, and the jury was instructed on, alternative means of committing DUI, i.e., operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, but the State failed to present evidence sufficient to show he attempted to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed Defendant's DUI conviction but under different reasoning, holding (1) the legislature did not intend the phrase "operate or attempt to operate" to create alternative means of committing the crime of DUI, and the court of appeals erred in finding otherwise; (2) the district court's inclusion of that phrase in the charging instructions in this case did not create a jury unanimity problem; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Ahrens" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated intimidation of a victim. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Defendant sought review, claiming that the State erred in failing to present sufficient evidence to support the alternative means of committing the crime of aggravated intimidation of a witness under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3833, and the error required reversal of his conviction for this crime pursuant to State v. Wright. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3832, which defines the crime of intimidation of a witness, does not contain the alternative means alleged by Defendant; (2) the statutory definition of malice does not create alternative means; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant attempted to prevent or dissuade his victim from reporting his crimes and that he acted with the requisite malice in doing so. View "State v. Aguirre" on Justia Law