Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Montrez Washington was convicted of first-degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. Washington appealed, arguing that (1) insufficient evidence was presented at his preliminary hearing, and (2) the Allen-type jury instruction given at his trial was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at Washington's preliminary hearing was sufficient to bind him over for trial, and (2) the Allen-type instruction was not clearly erroneous under the facts of this case where the instruction was included in the jury instructions given before jury deliberations and there was no indication the instruction changed the outcome of the trial. View "State v. Washington" on Justia Law

Subsequent to the sentencing hearing at which Appellant Justin Jones was sentenced for committing the crime of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, the Supreme Court filed several decisions that explained the steps to be taken if a sentencing court departed from the sentence provided for in Jessica's Law. The sentencing court did not explicitly take these steps or make the corresponding findings. As a result, under these recent decisions, Appellant's sentence would be considered illegal. The State argued that Appellant could not complain about his sentence because he had agreed to the sentence as part of a plea agreement. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant's sentence, noting that a defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Shannon Bogguess requested a bench trial on stipulated facts after his motion to suppress his confession was denied. Bogguess was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) Bogguess reserved his right to appeal while proceeding to a bench trial on stipulated facts even through he did not do so expressly; (2) at the Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine whether Bogguess' confession was voluntary, the district court erred in ruling that Bogguess must answer questions about events that were the bases for the crimes charged, and the court erred in striking all of Bogguess' testimony after he refused to testify further because Bogguess had a valid Fifth Amendment privilege; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Bogguess' motion to suppress. View "State v. Bogguess" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Willie Dale was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Dale's petition for review on the single issue of whether the district court erred in admitting a slow motion version of a patrol-car video. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the best evidence, namely the original video, had already been admitted at trial, and the modified video was not introduced to prove or disprove the content of the original video, the video's admission did not violate the best evidence rule; and (2) because the video was not unduly repetitious and added something to the State's case, its admission was not cumulative. View "State v. Dale" on Justia Law

Anthony Kidd was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated assault, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and aggravated battery. Kidd appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, (1) the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication; and (2) the prosecutor violated his duty to inform the State that an order in limine prohibited reference to Kidd's prior crimes, but this error and one witness's subsequent violation of that order did not affect the outcome of the trial, and therefore, the error was harmless. The Court rejected Kidd's remaining claims. View "State v. Kidd" on Justia Law

Ricky Hyche pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a Jessica's Law offense, and received a hard twenty-five sentence with lifetime electronic monitoring. Hyche appealed, arguing (1) he should be eligible for parole after twenty years, not twenty-five, pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(b)(2); (2) lifetime electronic monitoring was an invalid component of his sentence under State v. Jolly; and (3) his motion for a downward departure from the hard twenty-five sentence should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the balance of Hyche's sentence but vacated the component of his sentence imposing lifetime electronic monitoring, holding that under Jolly, this part of Hyche's sentence was inappropriate. View "State v. Hyche" on Justia Law

John Harsh pled nolo contendere to one count of rape for engaging in sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of fourteen. Prior to sentencing, Harsh moved for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence under Jessica's Law, seeking instead a sentence of 258 months. The district court denied Harsh's motion and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Harsh's departure motion, concluding that reasonable persons could take the view adopted by the district court; but (2) vacated the portion of Harsh's sentence ordering lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted the relevant sentencing statutes in this case. View "State v. Harsh" on Justia Law

Saul Miller was convicted of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Miller's first trial ended in a mistrial when the State repeatedly violated the trial court's pretrial order limiting admission of the victim's statement. After retrial, the court of appeals affirmed Miller's convictions and sentences. Miller filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court rejected all of Miller's arguments on appeal and affirmed Miller's conviction and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) double jeopardy did not bar Miller's second trial and convictions because, while the mistrial was warranted, there was no evidence the prosecutor intended to provoke the mistrial; and (2) under an objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the child victim's statements to a sexual assault nurse examiner were nontestimonial, and therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the statements. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

William Bennington was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, rape, two counts of criminal use of a financial card, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy. Bennington appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court rejected most of Bennington's arguments but reversed his convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, holding that the statements of the victim, who died before the trial, to a sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial and should not have been admitted by the trial court because the statements (1) were made in the presence of a law enforcement officer who asked questions, and (2) reported past events rather than information regarding an ongoing public safety or medical emergency. View "State v. Bennington" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Wabaunsee County amended its zoning regulations to permit small wind energy conversion systems. The regulations, however, prohibited the placement of commercial wind energy conversion systems in the county. Plaintiffs and Intervenors, landowners and owners of wind rights in the county, sued the Board, seeking a judicial declaration that the Board's action be null and void. The district court granted the Board's various dispositive motions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) the district court did not err by disposing of a Takings Clause claim as a matter of law, and because there was no taking, the court did not err in also disposing of Intervenors' related takings-based claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and their claim for inverse condemnation; (2) the district court did not err in dismissing a Commerce Clause claim as a matter of law, but a claim alleging the Board's decision placed incidental burdens on interstate commerce that outweighed the benefits was remanded for analysis under Pike v. Bruce Church; and (3) because Intervenors also made a burden-based claim under the Commerce Clause in their 42 U.S.C. 1983 contention, that specific claim was also remanded. View "Zimmerman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law