Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ten years after Rolland Berreth was convicted and sentenced for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sodomy with a child under fourteen years of age, Berreth filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Berreth's appointed counsel later filed several motions, all of which argued multiplicity, expanding Berreth's pro se motion. The district court ruled Berreth's aggravated kidnapping conviction was multiplicitous with the aggravated criminal sodomy convictions, reduced Berreth's aggravated kidnapping conviction to kidnapping, and therefore reduced Berreth's sentence. The State filed its notice of appeal and docketing statement, each specifically describing the appeal as one taken upon a question reserved under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3602(b)(3). The court of appeals reversed the district court and ordered reinstatement of Berreth's original sentence, holding that the district court erred in determining Berreth's convictions were multiplicitous and in resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, remanded, and ordered reinstatement of Berreth's reduced sentence, holding that the court of appeals failed to properly treat the State's appeal as a question reserved. View "State v. Berreth" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Adams was convicted by a jury of six counts relating to a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. Adams appealed, claiming error at various stages of the trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Adams' convictions and affirmed in part and vacated in part Adams' sentences, specifically vacating Adams' sentence for possession of lithium metal with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, holding that the trial court erred in classifying this offense as a severity level two drug felony under the identical offense sentencing doctrine. Remanded for resentencing on that count as a severity level four drug felony. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

On July 1, 2010, the legislature enacted the Kansas Indoor Clean Air Act. The Act generally prohibits smoking in public places but exempts Class B clubs, premises operated for profit to which members resort for the consumption of food or alcoholic beverages, as long as the clubs were so licensed as of January 1, 2009. Downtown Bar & Grill was not licensed as a Class B club on January 1, 2009, and thus was ineligible for a smoking ban exemption under the Act. Downtown Bar brought this declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to declare that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause and to accordingly issue temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The trial court agreed, holding that the cut-off date of January 1, 2009 was arbitrary, which therefore meant the statute could not be rational. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred in finding that the statute was not rational; and (2) therefore, Downtown Bar was unable to establish an element essential to issuance of a temporary injunction: a substantial likelihood of eventual success on the merits. Remanded. View "Downtown Bar & Grill v. State" on Justia Law

Joshua Coman pled guilty to misdemeanor criminal sodomy, as defined in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3505(a)(1), based upon an incident with a dog. The Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) requires registration for those who commit felony criminal sodomy but omits the misdemeanor criminal sodomy for which Coman was convicted. Nevertheless, in addition to specifically named crimes, the list includes a catch-all provision under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4902(c)(14), which requires registration for those committing sexually motivated acts. The district court found that Coman was required to register under KORA because the act giving rise to his conviction for the unlisted version of criminal sodomy was sexually motivated. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the order requiring Coman to register after construing the statute as a whole, holding that the legislature did not intend to include the acts constituting the sex crime defined in section 21-3505(a)(1) to be included within the catch-all provisions of section 22-4902(c)(14). View "State v. Coman" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers made a traffic stop of Defendant Dinah Sanchez-Loredo's vehicle, detained her at the scene for approximately 75 minutes while obtaining a search warrant, and recovered a large quantity of methamphetamine and some drug paraphernalia during the ensuing automobile search. The district court suppressed the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia, determining that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless search and seizure. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the mobility of a vehicle provides exigent circumstances to search the vehicle regardless of the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the mobility of a vehicle fulfills the requirement of exigent circumstances, so that a warrantless vehicle search is permitted based solely on probable cause. View "State v. Sanchez-Loredo" on Justia Law

Drugs were discovered during a warrantless search inside a vehicle that Bernard Preston was driving. Preston was subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. Preston appealed, alleging numerous trial errors, including his claims that the vehicle search was illegal and that his prior drug conviction was improperly admitted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of the admission of Preston's prior drug conviction, holding (1) the evidence of Preston's prior drug conviction was admitted in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 and State v. Boggs because Preston disputed the allegations; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Preston" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain proceeding, Landowner, Manhattan Ice and Cold Storage, initiated district court review of the $3.2 million appraisers' award for the taking of three tracts of land by the condemning authority, the City of Manhattan. The jury returned a verdict of $3.5 million. Landowner appealed, arguing that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and refusal to instruct on special use prevented it from presenting its theory of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Landowner's challenges to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings lacked merit and/or resulted in no prejudice; and (2) the jury instructions given in this case were legally sound. View "Manhattan Ice & Cold Storage v. City of Manhattan" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether a trial court constitutionally erred in denying Father's last-minute request to provide his testimony by telephone from Georgia in a Kansas hearing to terminate Father's parental rights. The trial court held that without this testimony, Father failed to rebut the presumption of his parental unfitness established by the State's evidence. Father's parental rights therefore were terminated. A majority of the court of appeals panel reversed, holding that the trial court's ruling denied Father of procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the panel majority and affirmed the trial court on slightly different grounds, holding that Father failed to establish that his testimony by telephone was warranted, as Father was given appropriate notice of the time, place, and purpose of his parental rights termination hearing and an opportunity to appear there and be heard in a meaningful manner. View "In re K.E." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Ranell Turner was convicted of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, criminal threat, and kidnapping. Turner had two prior conviction events for rape and one prior conviction event for aggravated criminal sodomy and for deviant sexual assault. At sentencing, the district court classified Turner as an aggravated habitual sex offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for the rape and aggravated criminal sodomy convictions under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4642. Turner appealed, arguing that two other statutes also governed his convictions and sentences that had more lenient sentences. The Supreme Court vacated Turner's sentence after finding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4704 and section 21-4642 overlapped and applying the rule that when the legislature allows two conflicting statutory provisions to coexist, the rule of lenity applies and the courts must follow the statutory provision more favorable to the accused. Remanded for imposition of sentence under section 21-4704. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

Leslie Roberts pleaded no contest to one count of rape and was found guilty by the district court. Roberts' crimes subjected him to a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years in prison under Jessica's Law. The district court denied Roberts' motion for a departure and sentenced him to a life sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years in prison along with lifetime postrelease supervision. For the first time on appeal, Roberts argued that both aspects of his sentence violated his constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the cruel and unusual punishment claim was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the departure motion. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law