Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

City cited Defendant, which operated a grain elevator facility inside city limits, for violating municipal noise and nuisance ordinances. After a bench trial, the municipal court found Defendant guilty of violating both ordinances. The district court reversed, concluding that the ordinances were unconstitutionally vague because they did not warn potential violators of what conduct was prohibited and failed adequately to guar against the risk of arbitrary enforcement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the City's noise ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; but (2) the nuisance ordinance was constitutional as applied to Defendant. View "City of Lincoln Ctr. v. Farmway Coop., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with no tax stamp affixed, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, concluding, among other things, that Defendant's convictions of possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with no tax stamp were not multiplicitous. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana, holding that Defendant's convictions of possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana with no tax stamp violated Kan. Stat. Ann 21-3107(2)(b)'s prohibition against a person being convicted of both a greater and a lesser crime. View "State v. Hensley" on Justia Law

The taxpayers in this case were out-of-state natural gas marketing companies, out-of-state local distribution companies that were certified as public utilities in their states, and out-of-state municipalities. Each taxpayer bought natural gas from producers or other marketers then delivered it to pipelines under contracts allowing the taxpayers to withdraw equivalent amounts of gas at a later time from out-of-state distribution points. The taxpayers filed requests for ad valorem tax exemption, claiming the natural gas was exempt under Kan. Const. art. 11, 1, which exempts merchants' inventory from ad valorem taxation but does not exempt tangible personal property owned by a public utility. The Kansas Court of Tax Appeals determined the natural gas was not exempt because the taxpayers were public utilities pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-5a01. The Supreme Court held (1) the taxation at issue did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) section 79-5a01 was constitutional as applied to the out-of-state local distribution companies; but (3) section 79-5a01 was unconstitutional as applied to the out-of-state natural gas marketing companies and those taxpayers that were out-of-state municipalities because those entities were not public utilities under the meaning of the statute. View "In re Property Valuation Appeals of Various Applicants" on Justia Law

After Defendant was charged with rape and other crimes, the district court appointed an attorney from the public defender's office to represent Defendant. The appointed attorney subsequently filed three motions to withdraw as Defendant's counsel. The first two motions were due to conflicts of interest. The district court forced defense counsel to represent Defendant at trial, after which the attorney/client relationship deteriorated to the point that all communication ceased. After the jury convicted Defendant of all charges but before sentencing, defense counsel filed a third motion to withdraw on the ground of prejudice and bias. The district court ordered the conflicted attorney to continue representing Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's complete disregard for Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel during his criminal prosecution was reversible error. Remanded. View "State v. Stovall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two Kansas residents who entered into an agreement with an out-of-state limited liability company (LLC) to assist them in managing their consumer debt and in dealing with their creditors. Plaintiffs brought an action against the LLC, its managing member, and other entities in federal court for alleged violations of the Kansas Credit Services Organization Act (KCSOA) and the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA). The U.S. district court certified two questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the application of KCSOA and KCPA to attorneys and law firms. The Supreme Court answered by holding (1) If an attorney who is licensed to practice law in Kansas and who is acting within the course and scope of his or her practice is exempt from the provisions of the KCSOA, the attorney's law firm is also exempt; and (2) attorneys are not inherently exempt from the reach of the KCPA by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, but certain statutory remedies may be unconstitutional if they encroach on the traditional exclusive powers of the court, especially the powers relating to issuing and regulating the license to practice law. View "Hays v. Ruther" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several offenses, including the crime of forgery in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3710(a)(2). Defendant appealed his forgery conviction, which was based upon his attempt to cash a $350 check at CheckSmart. Defendant argued that the terms "issuing or delivering" in section 21-3710(a)(2) established alternative means of committing forgery and that the State did not present sufficient evidence that Defendant issued the forged check. The court of appeals upheld the forgery conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend to create alternative means of committing forgery, and consequently, the State did not have to present evidence that Defendant both issued the check and delivered the check; and (2) the substantial competent evidence that established that Defendant delivered a fraudulent check knowingly and with intent to defraud was sufficient to support Defendant's forgery conviction. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, arson, and aggravated burglary. On appeal, Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the district judge's denial of his motion to suppress a videotape of his interview with law enforcement. Defendant subsequently filed several motions, including a motion to correct an illegal sentence, raising issues related to the use of his statements to law enforcement. A later motion was also entitled motion to correct illegal sentence and contained arguments similar to those Defendant raised earlier. The motions were denied by the district court. Defendant appealed the summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lack of an evidentiary hearing below did not preclude the Court's meaningful review; and (2) res judicata applied in this case. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of capital murder for the intentional and premeditated killing of Rachel Dennis in the commission of, or subsequent to the commission of, attempted rape. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, among other things, that (1) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct by commenting on the defense expert's compensation or in drawing inferences from forensic evidence during closing argument; (2) the trial judge did not err in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior, premarital sexual relationship because the evidence was relevant, not prohibited by Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-447, and not unduly prejudicial; (3) the trial judge did not err in admitting opinion testimony of a lay witness regarding Defendant's state of mind; and (4) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Lowrance" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty or no contest plea to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which was a nonperson felony due to Defendant's two previous misdemeanor convictions for the same offense. During the proceeding, Defendant unsuccessfully challenged the State's reliance on one of his misdemeanor convictions, claiming that his attorney had filed a guilty plea in that case without consulting him. On appeal, Defendant again objected to the inclusion of the prior misdemeanor in his criminal history. The court of appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if a defendant charged with felony DUI pleads guilty or no contest to the felony, and wishes to challenge the validity of a prior misdemeanor DUI used to classify the severity level of the current charge or to enhance the sentence following conviction on the current charge, the defendant will be limited on appeal to arguing the impropriety of the prior misdemeanor's effect as a sentencing enhancement; and (2) the court of appeals should have considered the merits of Defendant's claim in this case that he should have been sentenced for misdemeanor DUI rather than felony DUI. Remanded. View "State v. Key" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) under Kansas' version of a stand-your-ground-law in effect at the time of the crime, he was immune from prosecution; and (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his argument that he was immune from prosecution under the stand-your-ground statute because he made the argument for the first time on appeal, and the statute must be asserted before trial or opens or a dispositive plea is entered; and (2) the prosecutor made an incorrect statement of law about the jury's process during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, but this error was harmless. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law