Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for fifty years (hard fifty) on the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his hard fifty sentence, including the district court’s unauthorized imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that Defendant’s hard fifty life sentence was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States and State v. Soto and that the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision for Defendant’s off-grid convictions. View "State v. Molina" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and abuse of a seventeen-month-old child. Defendant was sentenced to life without possibility of parole for fifty years (hard fifty). The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated his hard fifty life sentence, holding that the hard fifty sentencing procedure set out in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4635 was unconstitutional under Alleyne v. United States and State v. Soto because the sentencing scheme permitted a judge, rather than a jury, to find aggravating circumstances necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising a number of issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by misstating the legal definition of “premeditation,” but this misstatement did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial and was therefore harmless; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury; (4) Defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated because of witness and juror misconduct or by the State’s exercise of its peremptory challenges; and (5) cumulative errors did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

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After his first trial ended with a hung jury, Defendant was retried and convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal from Defendant’s second trial, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s right to be protected from double jeopardy by allowing him to be retried for the same crimes without formally ordering a mistrial at the conclusion of his first trial; (2) there was sufficient evidence to affirm Defendant’s murder conviction; and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by misstating the legal definition of “premeditation,” but this misstatement did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and criminal possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising four assignments of error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by misstating the legal definition of “premeditation,” but this misstatement did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (2) the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges to strike African-Americans from the jury panel did not violate the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit-first-degree murder. View "State v. Kettler " on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for fifty years. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding that the state’s former statutory procedure for imposing a hard fifty sentence as utilized in this case violated the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution as interpreted in Alleyne v. United States because it permitted a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased mandatory minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. DeAnda" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for parole for fifty years. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the state’s hard fifty sentencing scheme was constitutional. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Following its decision in Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court vacated the Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Alleyne. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when it imposed the hard fifty sentence. View "State v. Astorga" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct in two statements made during closing argument, but the misconduct did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (2) the trial court did not clearly err in failing to instruct the jury on unintentional but reckless second-degree murder; (3) the trial court did not err in its remaining instructions to the jury; (4) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no factual support for Defendant’s motions for mistrial; (5) the cumulative errors did not deny Defendant a fair trial; and (6) the district court had jurisdiction to award restitution after judgment was pronounced at sentencing. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

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Defendant was charged with thirteen felonies. On the morning trial was set to begin, Defendant’s counsel orally renewed a motion to withdraw at Defendant’s request. The district judge denied the motion. Defendant subsequently decided to change his plea from not guilty to no contest to one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. The district judge accepted the pleas. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his pleas, which the district court denied. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district judge denied his right to counsel by hearing the motion to withdraw plea without appointing a new lawyer for him. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when Defendant filed his motion to withdraw plea, the district judge failed to give due consideration to whether Defendant was represented by competent counsel. In fact, neither Defendant’s counsel nor the district judge communicated all of the appeal rights Defendant would surrender as a matter of law by entering his no contest pleas, and “failure to follow the law is an abuse of discretion.” Remanded. View "State v. Kenney" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated kidnapping. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (i) Defendant’s claim that his preliminary hearing counsel had a conflict of interest was without merit; (ii) Defendant’s argument that his trial court’s admission into evidence of his prior sex crimes for propensity purposes was not preserved for appeal; (iii) the jury was properly instructed and sufficient evidence supported the aiding-and-abetting rape conviction; (iv) the district court’s delivery of a written response to a jury question outside of Defendant’s presence was harmless error; and (2) vacated the portion of Defendant’s sentence ordering him not to have contact with his codefendants or the victim, holding that the district court exceeded its authority in imposing this portion of the sentence, and affirmed the remainder of Defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Bowen" on Justia Law