Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Property owners appealed a special tax assessment the Board of County Commissioners levied against real property for cleanup costs the County claimed it incurred while removing dangerous structures and unsightly conditions on that property. The district court found subject matter jurisdiction lacking and granted the County's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property owners' claims could be brought on direct review under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-907(a), which provides injunctive relief against an illegal levy or enforcement of any tax, charge, or assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed and in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under section 60-907(a) on two of its three issues; and (2) because the district court went beyond the jurisdiction question and found for the County on the merits and the court of appeals stopped short of considering the merits of any claims when it found the entire case was jurisdictionally barred, the court of appeals erred in part in its jurisdictional ruling. Remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the remaining claims. View "Barnes v. Board of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Shane Marquis was placed on probation after being convicted of drug charges and felony theft. Later, the State sought to revoke Marquis' probation, claiming he failed to successfully complete a required boot camp. At the revocation hearing, the community corrections officer assigned to Marquis' case did not testify, but, instead, the State presented the officer's affidavit. The district court determined that Marquis violated the conditions of his probation and revoked the probation. Marquis appealed, contending that the district court violated his right of confrontation by considering his supervising officer's affidavit without complying with the requirements for the admission of testimonial hearsay set forth in Crawford v. Washington. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is inapplicable in a probation revocation proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment affords a probation minimum due process rights as a prerequisite to the revocation of probation. Remanded for the district court to inquire as to whether the State's failure to produce the supervising officer as a witness violated Marquis' due process rights. View "State v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Will Wimbley was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Wimbley filed two motions for postconviction relief. At issue in the motions were (1) the prosecutor's closing statement that "premeditation can occur in an instant," and (2) questions surrounding DNA evidence on the murder weapon. Wimbley's first motion was denied by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed. In his second motion for postconviction relief, Wimbley argued that a recent Supreme Court decision, State v. Holmes, represented an intervening change in the law. The district court summarily denied the motion, finding the motion was successive and untimely. The court of appeals held that Holmes represented a clear change in the law, and therefore, reversed Wimbley's underlying convictions and remanded for a new trial. On review, the Supreme Court found the district court's rulings to be appropriate and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Holmes did not change the legal definition of premeditation but rather looked at the prejudicial impact of a prosecutor's misstatement that premeditation can occur in an instant, and (2) the district court was justified in declining Wimbley's request for retesting of the murder weapon. View "Wimbley v. State" on Justia Law

Daniel Perez was charged with first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and conspiracy to commit criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. After the state moved to try Perez as an adult, the district court authorized adult prosecution. Perez was convicted of all charges. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Perez's argument that he was entitled to have a jury make the determination whether he should be tried as an adult was not properly before the appellate court for review because it was asserted for the first time on appeal; (2) the district court's Allen-type instruction to the jury before deliberations began was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury at trial on second-degree reckless murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

Charles Jones was sixteen years old when he was charged with first-degree murder and aggravated burglary. The district court certified Jones to stand trial as an adult on the charge of first-degree murder, and Jones was later convicted of the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed Jones' conviction and sentence. Jones subsequently filed a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his juvenile waiver hearing pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507, which was denied by the district court. The court of appeals determined that counsel's performance at the waiver hearing was deficient but that Jones was not prejudiced by counsel's performance. Three months later, Jones filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504, arguing that the juvenile waiver proceedings were defective for several reasons. The district court summarily denied Jones' motion after finding the sufficiency of the juvenile waiver proceeding was raised on appeal and in his earlier Section 60-1507 action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the motion without a hearing because the motion conclusively showed that Jones did not establish a basis for determining his sentence was illegal. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Sterling Hall was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Hall appealed, contending, inter alia, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by misstating the evidence and the law regarding the element of premeditation, by injecting his personal belief into closing argument, and by inflaming the passions of the jury by appealing to the jurors' sense of responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed Hall's convictions and sentences, holding (1) although the prosecutor misstated the law as it related to the facts of this case regarding Hall's ability to premeditate the killing, the error did not prejudice Hall's right to a fair trial under the circumstances presented; (2) the district court did not clearly err in failing to give the instruction for second-degree murder as a lesser included offense; (3) the evidence of premeditation was sufficient to support Hall's first-degree murder conviction; and (4) there were no cumulative trial or sentencing errors. View "State v. Hall" on Justia Law

Christopher Hall was charged with aggravated battery, attempted murder in the first-degree, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, murder in the first-degree, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and criminal desecration of a body. The district court initially determined that Hall was incompetent to stand trial, but after a doctor wrote a report determining that Hall was competent, the district judge found Hall competent to stand trial. Hall then pleaded guilty on all counts charged. The district court found Hall competent to enter his plea and found him guilty on all counts. Hall appealed, arguing that the district court judge erred by accepting his guilty plea and by failing to inform him of the maximum penalty that could be imposed for first-degree murder. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Hall's appeal of his conviction for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Hall surrendered any right he had to appeal his conviction without first attempting to withdraw his plea in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err by finding Hall competent to be sentenced on the first-degree murder charge. View "State v. Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant Ho Duong was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court judge sentenced Duong to sixty-one months in prison and lifetime postrelease supervision with lifetime electronic monitoring. The Supreme Court affirmed Duong's conviction and vacated the electronic monitoring portion of his sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments in closing argument did not deny Duong a fair trial; (2) the district judge's omission of a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction was not clearly erroneous; (3) Duong's objection to the district judge's Allen-type instruction was not specific, and the district court judge did not clearly err in giving the instruction; and (4) the journal entry of judgment ordering lifetime electronic monitoring was in error because the district judge lacked power to impose parole conditions. View "State v. Duong" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Denmark-Wagner entered into a written plea agreement on a charge of felony first-degree murder, which stated that Defendant's sentence would be life in prison. The district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison with eligibility for parole after twenty years and lifetime postrelease. Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and vacated the lifetime postrelease and offender registration portions of his sentence, holding (1) the district court judge did not err in refusing to grant Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea as involuntary as any family pressure that existed did not rise to the level of good cause; (2) the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that Defendant understood his plea and likely sentence and did not err in refusing to permit withdrawal of Defendant's plea as unknowingly or unintelligently made; (3) the postrelease supervision portion of Defendant's sentence did not conform to the applicable statute and was illegal; and (4) the lifetime offender registration requirement of Defendant's sentence did not conform to the applicable statute and was illegal. Remanded. View "State v. Denmark-Wagner" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff stopped Myron Coleman for speeding. While detaining Coleman, the deputy sheriff learned Coleman was on parole. Coleman's parole officer asked the deputy sheriff to detain Coleman for a search. Thirty-five minutes to an hour after the initial stop, the parole officer arrived. Coleman and his car were then searched. The search produced evidence leading to Coleman's charge for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine without tax stamps, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to package a controlled substance for sale. Coleman was convicted of all charges. On appeal, Coleman challenged the detention and search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had a reasonable suspicion that Coleman was engaging in criminal activity, justifying a temporary detention and allowing further investigation; (2) the deputy sheriff had no reasonable and legal basis for detaining Coleman while waiting for the parole officer to arrive at the scene; and (3) because the detention was of an unlawful duration, the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law