Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daniel Perez was charged with first-degree felony murder, criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and conspiracy to commit criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling. After the state moved to try Perez as an adult, the district court authorized adult prosecution. Perez was convicted of all charges. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Perez's argument that he was entitled to have a jury make the determination whether he should be tried as an adult was not properly before the appellate court for review because it was asserted for the first time on appeal; (2) the district court's Allen-type instruction to the jury before deliberations began was not clearly erroneous; and (3) the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury at trial on second-degree reckless murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. View "State v. Perez" on Justia Law

Charles Jones was sixteen years old when he was charged with first-degree murder and aggravated burglary. The district court certified Jones to stand trial as an adult on the charge of first-degree murder, and Jones was later convicted of the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed Jones' conviction and sentence. Jones subsequently filed a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at his juvenile waiver hearing pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507, which was denied by the district court. The court of appeals determined that counsel's performance at the waiver hearing was deficient but that Jones was not prejudiced by counsel's performance. Three months later, Jones filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504, arguing that the juvenile waiver proceedings were defective for several reasons. The district court summarily denied Jones' motion after finding the sufficiency of the juvenile waiver proceeding was raised on appeal and in his earlier Section 60-1507 action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the motion without a hearing because the motion conclusively showed that Jones did not establish a basis for determining his sentence was illegal. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Sterling Hall was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Hall appealed, contending, inter alia, that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by misstating the evidence and the law regarding the element of premeditation, by injecting his personal belief into closing argument, and by inflaming the passions of the jury by appealing to the jurors' sense of responsibility. The Supreme Court affirmed Hall's convictions and sentences, holding (1) although the prosecutor misstated the law as it related to the facts of this case regarding Hall's ability to premeditate the killing, the error did not prejudice Hall's right to a fair trial under the circumstances presented; (2) the district court did not clearly err in failing to give the instruction for second-degree murder as a lesser included offense; (3) the evidence of premeditation was sufficient to support Hall's first-degree murder conviction; and (4) there were no cumulative trial or sentencing errors. View "State v. Hall" on Justia Law

Christopher Hall was charged with aggravated battery, attempted murder in the first-degree, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, murder in the first-degree, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and criminal desecration of a body. The district court initially determined that Hall was incompetent to stand trial, but after a doctor wrote a report determining that Hall was competent, the district judge found Hall competent to stand trial. Hall then pleaded guilty on all counts charged. The district court found Hall competent to enter his plea and found him guilty on all counts. Hall appealed, arguing that the district court judge erred by accepting his guilty plea and by failing to inform him of the maximum penalty that could be imposed for first-degree murder. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Hall's appeal of his conviction for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Hall surrendered any right he had to appeal his conviction without first attempting to withdraw his plea in the district court; and (2) the district court did not err by finding Hall competent to be sentenced on the first-degree murder charge. View "State v. Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant Ho Duong was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The district court judge sentenced Duong to sixty-one months in prison and lifetime postrelease supervision with lifetime electronic monitoring. The Supreme Court affirmed Duong's conviction and vacated the electronic monitoring portion of his sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments in closing argument did not deny Duong a fair trial; (2) the district judge's omission of a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction was not clearly erroneous; (3) Duong's objection to the district judge's Allen-type instruction was not specific, and the district court judge did not clearly err in giving the instruction; and (4) the journal entry of judgment ordering lifetime electronic monitoring was in error because the district judge lacked power to impose parole conditions. View "State v. Duong" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Denmark-Wagner entered into a written plea agreement on a charge of felony first-degree murder, which stated that Defendant's sentence would be life in prison. The district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison with eligibility for parole after twenty years and lifetime postrelease. Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and vacated the lifetime postrelease and offender registration portions of his sentence, holding (1) the district court judge did not err in refusing to grant Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea as involuntary as any family pressure that existed did not rise to the level of good cause; (2) the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that Defendant understood his plea and likely sentence and did not err in refusing to permit withdrawal of Defendant's plea as unknowingly or unintelligently made; (3) the postrelease supervision portion of Defendant's sentence did not conform to the applicable statute and was illegal; and (4) the lifetime offender registration requirement of Defendant's sentence did not conform to the applicable statute and was illegal. Remanded. View "State v. Denmark-Wagner" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff stopped Myron Coleman for speeding. While detaining Coleman, the deputy sheriff learned Coleman was on parole. Coleman's parole officer asked the deputy sheriff to detain Coleman for a search. Thirty-five minutes to an hour after the initial stop, the parole officer arrived. Coleman and his car were then searched. The search produced evidence leading to Coleman's charge for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine without tax stamps, and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to package a controlled substance for sale. Coleman was convicted of all charges. On appeal, Coleman challenged the detention and search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had a reasonable suspicion that Coleman was engaging in criminal activity, justifying a temporary detention and allowing further investigation; (2) the deputy sheriff had no reasonable and legal basis for detaining Coleman while waiting for the parole officer to arrive at the scene; and (3) because the detention was of an unlawful duration, the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be suppressed. View "State v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Jamil Fulton was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Fulton received a hard twenty-five life sentence for the off-grid murder offense and a concurrent eight months' imprisonment for the criminal possession of a firearm conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the off-grid conviction, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to convict Fulton; (2) the district court did not err in denying Fulton's motion for a new trial; and (3) Fulton was not entitled to a new trial because of his counsel's failure to request that his trial be severed from his codefendant's trial where Fulton pointed to no set of facts that would make the situation extraordinary and prejudice was not apparent as a matter of law by the appellate record. View "State v. Fulton" on Justia Law

Yvonne Ward was convicted for fourteen felonies related to four separate cocaine sales. On appeal, Ward (1) argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mistrial that she made after witnesses for the prosecution identified two individuals sitting in the courtroom and wearing orange jail jumpsuits as people who were with Ward during one or more of the sales, and (2) challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. On review, Ward added a new issue, which the Supreme Court declined to address because it was not properly before the Court. The Supreme Court then affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, and (2) the evidence was sufficient. View "State v. Ward" on Justia Law

Julie Stieben was pulled over by a highway patrol trooper after the trooper watched Stieben's car cross the fog line three times. A jury found Stieben guilty of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court committed reversible error in the way it answered the jury's question about whether Stieben crossed the fog line when she first encountered the trooper, concluding (1) the failure of the trial court to give the jury additional information to clarify a point of fact was prejudicial and denied the defendant a fair trial, and (2) the court intruded on the province of the jury as the factfinder, interfering with Stieben's constitutional right to a trial by jury by not only answering the question, but by answering it incorrectly, possibly prejudicing Stieben's defense. View "State v. Stieben" on Justia Law