Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lafayette Cosby was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder after a second trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, (1) The district court properly excluded evidence of a question Cosby asked police because it was inadmissible hearsay; (2) the district judge correctly decided not to include a lesser included offense on voluntary manslaughter in the jury instructions; (3) the evidence of premeditation in this case was plainly sufficient to support Cosby's conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in reversible conduct or improperly shift the burden of proof on the element of premeditation to the defense with a certain comment to the jury because the prosecutor's challenged comment was within the wide latitude allowed the State in discussing the evidence. View "State v. Cosby" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Phouthavy Chanthaseng was convicted for aggravated indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, Chanthaseng argued that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and commenting on the credibility of the victim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by discussing the delayed and piecemeal "process of disclosure" of the abuse victim and by using personal experiences of venire panel members as substitute for evidence of disclosure pattern relevant to reliability; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing the abuse victim's credibility because the prosecutor's comments, when viewed in context, where accompanied by a discussion of the evidence presented at trial and merely asked the jury to draw permissible inferences from that evidence; and (3) the prosecutor's "process of disclosure" misconduct did not constitute plain error requiring reversal of Chanthaseng's conviction. View "State v. Chanthaseng" on Justia Law

Chester Roberts was arrested for the unlawful possession of prescription drugs after he was found in possession of a tablet of generic Lortab, for which he had no prescription. Roberts was charged with one count of possession of hydrocodone in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-4160(a). Roberts filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 56-4160(a) does not include hydrocodone combination products such as generic Lortab. The district court granted Roberts' motion. The State appealed the district court's order of dismissal. In response, Roberts argued that the State could not appeal the dismissal because the court's order was equivalent to a judgment of acquittal from which an appeal is barred both by statute and the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court held that, under the facts of this case where the order of dismissal was entered before trial, jeopardy had not yet attached, and therefore, the order was not a judgment of acquittal and the State's appeal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Jared Race was convicted of two counts of rape, three counts of aggravated criminal sodomy, and four counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district judge did not err by admitting certain testimony about one victim's allegation; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support conviction on the second count of rape of one victim; (3) the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Race's motions for mistrial based on one juror's observation of Race in a courthouse hallway while Race was wearing handcuffs, when the juror denied seeing anything remarkable about Race's appearance and had not shared his observation with other jurors; (4) the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a defense motion for mistrial when a juror was absent from the jury deliberations room for two minutes and Race did not demonstrate the jury deliberations continued during that time; and (5) error in failing to instruct the jury on the element of Race's age was harmless when Race's testimony confirming his age of eighteen years or older at the time of the offenses was uncontested. View "State v. Race" on Justia Law

In two cases consolidated for trial, a jury convicted Patrick Naputi on seven counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of fourteen. The district court granted Naputi's departure motion and imposed a sentence that included 122 months of incarceration, lifetime electronic monitoring, and lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the portion of the sentence ordering lifetime electronic monitoring in accordance with State v. Jolly, which states that the parole board has the sole authority to impose the electronic monitoring condition of parole. Remanded with instructions to eliminate the electronic monitoring requirement. View "State v. Naputi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Xavier Miller was convicted of intentional second-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed Miller's conviction. At issue on review was whether the district court clearly erred when it appropriately instructed the jury that it should simultaneously consider the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but then erroneously gave a contradictory instruction directing the jury to consider the offense of voluntary manslaughter only if it could not agree on the offense of second-degree murder. The Supreme Court reversed Miller's conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that there was a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict had it not received the inappropriate and contradictory instruction to consider the lesser-included offenses sequentially rather than simultaneously. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

While FBI task-force officers were looking to execute an arrest warrant for Shane Thompson, the officers saw Defendant Robert Johnson walking on a sidewalk. After requesting identification, the officers searched Johnson and discovered marijuana and crack cocaine. Johnson was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana. Johnson filed a motion to suppress, arguing there was a lack of reasonable suspicion to detain him. The district court denied the motion after listening to testimony describing the similarities between Defendant and Thompson. Johnson was convicted of the charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's sentences, holding that Johnson was illegally seized because (1) the State failed to meet its burden to show that it was reasonable for the officers to rely on a face sheet in detaining Defendant; and (2) detaining Defendant because he shared the generic common features with Thompson of being a black male with facial hair was not, without more, sufficient to give officers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Property owners appealed a special tax assessment the Board of County Commissioners levied against real property for cleanup costs the County claimed it incurred while removing dangerous structures and unsightly conditions on that property. The district court found subject matter jurisdiction lacking and granted the County's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property owners' claims could be brought on direct review under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-907(a), which provides injunctive relief against an illegal levy or enforcement of any tax, charge, or assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed and in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under section 60-907(a) on two of its three issues; and (2) because the district court went beyond the jurisdiction question and found for the County on the merits and the court of appeals stopped short of considering the merits of any claims when it found the entire case was jurisdictionally barred, the court of appeals erred in part in its jurisdictional ruling. Remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the remaining claims. View "Barnes v. Board of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Shane Marquis was placed on probation after being convicted of drug charges and felony theft. Later, the State sought to revoke Marquis' probation, claiming he failed to successfully complete a required boot camp. At the revocation hearing, the community corrections officer assigned to Marquis' case did not testify, but, instead, the State presented the officer's affidavit. The district court determined that Marquis violated the conditions of his probation and revoked the probation. Marquis appealed, contending that the district court violated his right of confrontation by considering his supervising officer's affidavit without complying with the requirements for the admission of testimonial hearsay set forth in Crawford v. Washington. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is inapplicable in a probation revocation proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment affords a probation minimum due process rights as a prerequisite to the revocation of probation. Remanded for the district court to inquire as to whether the State's failure to produce the supervising officer as a witness violated Marquis' due process rights. View "State v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Will Wimbley was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed on appeal. Wimbley filed two motions for postconviction relief. At issue in the motions were (1) the prosecutor's closing statement that "premeditation can occur in an instant," and (2) questions surrounding DNA evidence on the murder weapon. Wimbley's first motion was denied by the district court. The court of appeals affirmed. In his second motion for postconviction relief, Wimbley argued that a recent Supreme Court decision, State v. Holmes, represented an intervening change in the law. The district court summarily denied the motion, finding the motion was successive and untimely. The court of appeals held that Holmes represented a clear change in the law, and therefore, reversed Wimbley's underlying convictions and remanded for a new trial. On review, the Supreme Court found the district court's rulings to be appropriate and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Holmes did not change the legal definition of premeditation but rather looked at the prejudicial impact of a prosecutor's misstatement that premeditation can occur in an instant, and (2) the district court was justified in declining Wimbley's request for retesting of the murder weapon. View "Wimbley v. State" on Justia Law