Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ricky Hyche pled guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child, a Jessica's Law offense, and received a hard twenty-five sentence with lifetime electronic monitoring. Hyche appealed, arguing (1) he should be eligible for parole after twenty years, not twenty-five, pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3717(b)(2); (2) lifetime electronic monitoring was an invalid component of his sentence under State v. Jolly; and (3) his motion for a downward departure from the hard twenty-five sentence should have been granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the balance of Hyche's sentence but vacated the component of his sentence imposing lifetime electronic monitoring, holding that under Jolly, this part of Hyche's sentence was inappropriate. View "State v. Hyche" on Justia Law

John Harsh pled nolo contendere to one count of rape for engaging in sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of fourteen. Prior to sentencing, Harsh moved for a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence under Jessica's Law, seeking instead a sentence of 258 months. The district court denied Harsh's motion and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's denial of Harsh's departure motion, concluding that reasonable persons could take the view adopted by the district court; but (2) vacated the portion of Harsh's sentence ordering lifetime postrelease supervision, holding that the district court incorrectly interpreted the relevant sentencing statutes in this case. View "State v. Harsh" on Justia Law

Saul Miller was convicted of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Miller's first trial ended in a mistrial when the State repeatedly violated the trial court's pretrial order limiting admission of the victim's statement. After retrial, the court of appeals affirmed Miller's convictions and sentences. Miller filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court rejected all of Miller's arguments on appeal and affirmed Miller's conviction and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) double jeopardy did not bar Miller's second trial and convictions because, while the mistrial was warranted, there was no evidence the prosecutor intended to provoke the mistrial; and (2) under an objective evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, the child victim's statements to a sexual assault nurse examiner were nontestimonial, and therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the statements. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

William Bennington was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, rape, two counts of criminal use of a financial card, and two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy. Bennington appealed his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court rejected most of Bennington's arguments but reversed his convictions for aggravated criminal sodomy, holding that the statements of the victim, who died before the trial, to a sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial and should not have been admitted by the trial court because the statements (1) were made in the presence of a law enforcement officer who asked questions, and (2) reported past events rather than information regarding an ongoing public safety or medical emergency. View "State v. Bennington" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count each of off-grid aggravated indecent liberties, aggravated indecent liberties, and criminal sodomy. In exchange for Defendant's plea, the State agreed to join in Jacobs' motion for departure from Jessica's Law to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act grid for the off-grid aggravated indecent liberties conviction. The sentencing judge conformed to the parties' agreement on the departure motion and imposed three sentences for each conviction, all of which were ordered to run consecutive to each other. Jacobs appealed, arguing that his sentence under Jessica's Law violated the state and federal constitutions and that the sentencing judge erred by making his sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's first argument could not be ruled upon for the first time on appeal, and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to address Jacobs' second argument. View "State v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Appellant Nathan Inkelaar was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated criminal sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Appellant's alleged prior sexual abuse and determined the evidence was not unduly prejudicial; (2) the prosecutor questions during cross-examination of Appellant's brother were improper but there was no showing of deliberate misconduct, and the State met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect Appellant's substantial rights; (3) the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence Appellant under Jessica's Law, as the amended complaints listed Appellant's date of birth and the court's error in failing to instruct the jury regarding Appellant's age was harmless; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of third-party guilt. View "State v. Inkelaar" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Christopher Tahah of felony murder and the underlying felony of discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling resulting in great bodily harm. During trial, Tahah argued for a lesser-included offense instruction of second-degree unintentional murder and involuntary manslaughter. The felony-murder rule then in effect provided that, under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3414(3), requiring instructions on lesser-included offenses where there is evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser-included crime did not apply when murder was committed during the commission of a felony. The district court applied the felony-murder rule and denied Tahah's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to give the lesser-included offense instruction in light of the Court's recent decision in State v. Berry, which held that section 22-3414(3) no longer makes an exception for felony murder. View "State v. Tahah" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Hulett was charged with first-degree murder. Before trial, Hulett filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding no conflict of interest, no irreconcilable conflict, and no complete breakdown between Hulett and counsel. Hulett then pleaded guilty to felony murder. Before sentencing, Hulett filed a motion to set aside his plea that made no mention of any conflict between Hulett and his counsel. The district judge denied the motion. Hulett then appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was deprived of conflict-free counsel at the hearing on his motion and seeking a reversal and remand for appointment of substitute counsel to represent him at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no error in the district court's failure to address a nonexistent, possible conflict of interest between Hulett and counsel at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea. View "State v. Hulett" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Michael Tully of one count of rape. The court of appeals affirmed Tully's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and district court, holding (1) Tully's rights as protected by Miranda v. Arizona and Doyle v. Ohio were violated by the State's improper comments on Tully's postarrest silence; (2) the district court gave an improper jury instruction on the element of force; (3) the district court abused its discretion in allowing a State's expert witness to offer an opinion beyond her qualifications, which also invaded the province of the jury; and (4) the cumulative errors denied Tully a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Tully" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Barnes was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. Barnes was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole with a consecutive fourteen months for the aggravated assault. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes' convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse her discretion when she accepted Barnes' jury trial waiver and continued with the trial to the bench despite Barnes' difficulty in choosing between jury and bench trial; (2) the district judge did not err in accepting Barnes' knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial right; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Barnes possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crimes. View "State v. Barnes" on Justia Law