Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Ten years after Rolland Berreth was convicted and sentenced for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sodomy with a child under fourteen years of age, Berreth filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Berreth's appointed counsel later filed several motions, all of which argued multiplicity, expanding Berreth's pro se motion. The district court ruled Berreth's aggravated kidnapping conviction was multiplicitous with the aggravated criminal sodomy convictions, reduced Berreth's aggravated kidnapping conviction to kidnapping, and therefore reduced Berreth's sentence. The State filed its notice of appeal and docketing statement, each specifically describing the appeal as one taken upon a question reserved under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3602(b)(3). The court of appeals reversed the district court and ordered reinstatement of Berreth's original sentence, holding that the district court erred in determining Berreth's convictions were multiplicitous and in resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed, remanded, and ordered reinstatement of Berreth's reduced sentence, holding that the court of appeals failed to properly treat the State's appeal as a question reserved. View "State v. Berreth" on Justia Law

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Defendant Kenneth Adams was convicted by a jury of six counts relating to a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. Adams appealed, claiming error at various stages of the trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Adams' convictions and affirmed in part and vacated in part Adams' sentences, specifically vacating Adams' sentence for possession of lithium metal with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, holding that the trial court erred in classifying this offense as a severity level two drug felony under the identical offense sentencing doctrine. Remanded for resentencing on that count as a severity level four drug felony. View "State v. Adams" on Justia Law

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Joshua Coman pled guilty to misdemeanor criminal sodomy, as defined in Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3505(a)(1), based upon an incident with a dog. The Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) requires registration for those who commit felony criminal sodomy but omits the misdemeanor criminal sodomy for which Coman was convicted. Nevertheless, in addition to specifically named crimes, the list includes a catch-all provision under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4902(c)(14), which requires registration for those committing sexually motivated acts. The district court found that Coman was required to register under KORA because the act giving rise to his conviction for the unlisted version of criminal sodomy was sexually motivated. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the order requiring Coman to register after construing the statute as a whole, holding that the legislature did not intend to include the acts constituting the sex crime defined in section 21-3505(a)(1) to be included within the catch-all provisions of section 22-4902(c)(14). View "State v. Coman" on Justia Law

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Law enforcement officers made a traffic stop of Defendant Dinah Sanchez-Loredo's vehicle, detained her at the scene for approximately 75 minutes while obtaining a search warrant, and recovered a large quantity of methamphetamine and some drug paraphernalia during the ensuing automobile search. The district court suppressed the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia, determining that exigent circumstances did not exist to support a warrantless search and seizure. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the mobility of a vehicle provides exigent circumstances to search the vehicle regardless of the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the mobility of a vehicle fulfills the requirement of exigent circumstances, so that a warrantless vehicle search is permitted based solely on probable cause. View "State v. Sanchez-Loredo" on Justia Law

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Drugs were discovered during a warrantless search inside a vehicle that Bernard Preston was driving. Preston was subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. Preston appealed, alleging numerous trial errors, including his claims that the vehicle search was illegal and that his prior drug conviction was improperly admitted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of the admission of Preston's prior drug conviction, holding (1) the evidence of Preston's prior drug conviction was admitted in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 and State v. Boggs because Preston disputed the allegations; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "State v. Preston" on Justia Law

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The issue in this case was whether a trial court constitutionally erred in denying Father's last-minute request to provide his testimony by telephone from Georgia in a Kansas hearing to terminate Father's parental rights. The trial court held that without this testimony, Father failed to rebut the presumption of his parental unfitness established by the State's evidence. Father's parental rights therefore were terminated. A majority of the court of appeals panel reversed, holding that the trial court's ruling denied Father of procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the panel majority and affirmed the trial court on slightly different grounds, holding that Father failed to establish that his testimony by telephone was warranted, as Father was given appropriate notice of the time, place, and purpose of his parental rights termination hearing and an opportunity to appear there and be heard in a meaningful manner. View "In re K.E." on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant Ranell Turner was convicted of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, criminal threat, and kidnapping. Turner had two prior conviction events for rape and one prior conviction event for aggravated criminal sodomy and for deviant sexual assault. At sentencing, the district court classified Turner as an aggravated habitual sex offender and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole for the rape and aggravated criminal sodomy convictions under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4642. Turner appealed, arguing that two other statutes also governed his convictions and sentences that had more lenient sentences. The Supreme Court vacated Turner's sentence after finding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4704 and section 21-4642 overlapped and applying the rule that when the legislature allows two conflicting statutory provisions to coexist, the rule of lenity applies and the courts must follow the statutory provision more favorable to the accused. Remanded for imposition of sentence under section 21-4704. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Kameron King was convicted of possession of cocaine and failure to display a drug tax stamp. King was sentenced to thirty-four months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the officer who arrested King had authority to arrest him on the enclosed porch that was part of his home, and the officer had authority to arrest him for a misdemeanor committed two weeks before; and (2) it was error for the trial court to exclude the testimony of three witnesses, as the evidence was relevant, admissible, and noncumulative and was an integral part of Defendant's theory of defense. Because the error was not harmless, the Court reversed King's convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

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Marcy Carapezza and Jason Hughes (collectively, Defendants) were convicted of felony murder and other felonies. Following decisions by the Supreme Court remanding the cases for new trials, the district court suppressed certain evidence as being derived from Defendants' immunized inquisition testimony. The State took interlocutory appeals from the district court's suppression orders, contending that the court applied an incorrect burden of proof and that the State did not make an improper use of the immunized statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was unnecessary to determine the standard of proof to be applied to the derivative use of immunized testimony because, under either standard, the government failed to meet its burden of proving that it had not made a derivative use of Defendants' immunized statements. View "State v. Carapezza" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Elgin Robinson of capital murder, rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and violation of a protection from abuse order. The 14-year-old victim of Robinson's crimes, C.B., was nine months pregnant with Robinson's child at the time of her murder. The district court sentenced Robinson to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed Robinson's convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Robinson's motion to suppress evidence of Internet searches he conducted prior to the murder in which he searched for information on how to kill a baby and how to find a missing person; (2) denying Robinson's motion to suppress statements he made in a custodial interview regarding his knowledge of C.B.'s disappearance and murder; (3) admitting hearsay statements of C.B., although the court admitted them for the wrong reason; (4) admitting photographs of C.B.'s body and grave; (5) denying Robinson's motion for a change of judge; and (6) instructing the jury on the State's burden of proof. Additionally, the Court held that Robinson was not entitled to be resentenced under the identical offense doctrine. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law