Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of hydrocodone under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-4160(a), a severity level 4 drug felony. Defendant argued that eight Lortab pills in his possession were schedule III rather than schedule II drugs and that section 65-4160(a) was therefore inapplicable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the formulation of the Lortab in Defendant's possession in this case qualified it as a schedule III rather than a schedule II drug; but (2) as section 65-4160(a)'s prohibition is not limited to drugs on one or the other of these schedules, the district court did not err in finding that possession of Lortab was a proscribed felony under section 65-4160(a). View "State v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the imposition of three life sentences with a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years following his plea of guilty to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant contended that the sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's imposition of Defendant's sentences, holding (1) Defendant's sentences did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment; and (2) the district court did not commit reversible error when it denied Defendant's motion for departure from the hard twenty-five life sentence applicable under Jessica's Law. View "State v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy with a child less than fourteen years of age. The district court denied Defendant's motion to depart from the hard twenty-five life sentence provided for in Jessica's Law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because reasonable people would agree with the district court's determination that the mitigating factors presented by Defendant were not substantial and compelling in light of the circumstances of the case, which included the fact that the victim of a six-year-old autistic child who had been in Defendant's care at the time of the crime, expert testimony supported the conclusion that Defendant was likely to reoffend, and there was evidence of factors that supported the conclusion that Defendant was not amenable to rehabilitation. View "State v. Salinas" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of off-grid aggravated indecent liberties with a child pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State agreed to dismiss a third count and stand silent at sentencing. Defendant asked that the Jessica's Law life sentences with twenty-five-year mandatory minimums run concurrently, but the district court judge imposed two consecutive life sentences with no possibility of parole for fifty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to consider whether the district court abused its discretion in running these off-grid life sentences consecutively; and (2) under the facts of this case, it was not an abuse of discretion to impose the life sentences consecutively. View "State v. Frecks" on Justia Law

Phillip Baptist pleaded no contest to the off-grid crime of rape of a child under the age of fourteen. The district court imposed a hard twenty-five life sentence under Jessica's Law, meaning Baptist would only be eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years in prison, and also imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the sentence, holding (1) the statutory provision providing for a hard twenty-five life sentence is the only provision that applies when a defendant is sentenced under Jessica's law, and therefore, the district court did not err in sentencing Baptist to a hard twenty-five life sentence; (2) a defendant sentenced under Jessica's Law is subject to lifetime parole rather than lifetime postrelease supervision, and therefore, the district court erred in sentencing Baptist to lifetime postrelease supervision; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Baptist's motion to depart from the sentence provided for in Jessica's Law because reasonable people could have agreed that the aggravating circumstances of the crime outweighed the mitigating factor. Remanded. View "State v. Baptist" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child less than fourteen years old and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy of a child less than fourteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 592 months based on his criminal history score. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for departure from the mandatory sentencing provisions provided in Jessica's Law. Because the journal entry erroneously included lifetime postrelease supervision and lifetime electronic monitoring, the case was remanded with directions to correct that portion of the sentence. View "State v. Mason" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to an amended charge of kidnapping with the intent to facilitate flight and was sentenced to a term of five years in prison. Defendant signed a petition to enter a plea of guilty in which he verified that he entered the plea knowingly and understandingly and without threats or promises. Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea and also filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The district court denied both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied Defendant's motions, as (1) the State did not violate the plea agreement or fail to disclose exculpatory documents prior to the entry of Defendant's plea, and Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel prior to the entry of Defendant's plea; and (2) Defendant's challenge to the legality of his sentence was fatally flawed. View "State v. Szczygiel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated kidnapping, and an unlawful weapons violation. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences and a concurrent three- to ten-year sentence on the weapons conviction. Defendant appealed the district court's summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence. Defendant's motion alleged the district court imposed cumulative punishments for the felony murder and aggravated kidnapping convictions because both arose from the same act of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary denial of his motion because Defendant unsuccessfully argued the identical issue previously, and therefore, Defendant's claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction for criminal possession of a firearm in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4204(a)(4)(A), which imposes a ten-year prohibition on the possession of a firearm by persons convicted of certain felonies. Defendant had a 1994 conviction for aggravated battery, one of the felonies listed in section 21-4204(a)(4)(A), for which he served a prison sentence. Defendant was released from prison on that sentence in 2004. The district court found the ten-year firearm prohibition period began upon Defendant's release from prison in 2004. Defendant argued that, as applied to him, the statutory language prohibited firearm possession for ten years from his date of conviction, which period had expired before his firearm possession in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the ten-year ban on the possession of firearms began to run against Defendant on the date he was released from prison on the aggravated battery sentence. View "State v. LaGrange" on Justia Law

After pleading no contest to three counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing (1) the State breached the plea agreement by arguing against the recommended sentence in the agreement, and (2) the district court erred in determining the minimum prison term Defendant must serve before becoming eligible for parole and in including lifetime electronic monitoring in the journal entry of judgment. The Supreme Court (1) remanded the case to the district court for entry of a nunc pro tunc order deleting the reference to electronic monitoring in the journal entry, holding that the district court had no authority to impose lifetime electronic monitoring; and (2) affirmed the remainder of Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Antrim" on Justia Law