Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal followed a district court's denial of a defendant's motions for new trial based on postconviction DNA testing that was allowed under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-2512. The postconviction DNA testing produced some results that were favorable to the defendant, some results that confirmed evidence at trial, and some results that were inconclusive because the small amount and the degradation of the DNA prevented DNA matching. Weighing the mixed results of this evidence, the district court concluded there was not a reasonable probability that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed after noting that an abuse of discretion standard of review applies when the issue on appeal is whether a district court erred in ruling on a motion for new trial based on favorable postconviction DNA test results, holding that reasonable people could agree with the district court that the postconviction DNA test evidence was not so material as to make it reasonably probable there would be a different outcome if there were a new trial. View "Haddock v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, burglary, and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an audio recording of a 911 call made by the murder victim's wife; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of seven uncharged burglaries allegedly committed by Defendant for the purposes of proving identity and plan under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455; (3) the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct; (4) the sentencing court appropriately imposed a hard 50 sentence; and (5) the hard 50 sentencing scheme is constitutional. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction on several grounds. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of aggravated indecent liberties because (1) the State presented no evidence that Defendant engaged in any lewd fondling or touching of the complainant or himself, done or submitted to with the intent to arose or satisfy the sexual desires of the complainant, Defendant, or both; and (2) the State failed to present any evidence, much less sufficient evidence, that Defendant "submitted to lewd fondling or touching" as specified in the jury instruction. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

In the recent case of State v. Bogguess, the Supreme Court held that the lack of an objection during a bench trial that consisted solely of stipulated facts did not preclude appellate review of the pretrial denial of a defendant's motion to suppress. The instant case raised the question of whether the Bogguess holding applies when the bench trial is conducted by a different judge than the one who made the pretrial suppression ruling. The Court concluded that having more than one judge involved in the proceedings did not alter the two-fold rationale of the decision in Bogguess. In this case, the defendant's objection to evidence was preserved, and the court of appeals erred in concluding it was not. View "State v. Kelly" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Probationer was entitled to jail time credit toward a sentence for the time she spent in a residential drug abuse treatment facility when her sojourn had not been ordered as a condition of probation in the case where that prison sentence had been imposed. Probationer was statutorily required, and ordered as a condition of probation, to complete drug abuse treatment in the case involving a conviction for cocaine possession. But drug treatment was not statutorily required, or ordered as a condition of probation, in the case where her convictions concerned nondrug offenses. Probationer failed to complete her mandatory drug treatment, and the district court revoked her probation in both cases. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have awarded Probationer jail time credit toward her nondrug offense case's sentence for her time spent in drug abuse treatment. Although the treatment was ordered only as a condition of probation in Probationer's cocaine possession case, there was no statutory requirement that the time spent in such treatment be ordered in the same case in which the jail time credit was sought. Remanded. View "State v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery for stabbing her long-time friend multiple times in the head with a steak knife during an altercation inside of Defendant's home. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court should have, sua sponte, given instructions on no duty to retreat, use of force in defense of a dwelling, and a lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even if the trial court erred in omitting the no duty to retreat instruction in this case, Defendant failed to establish the requisite level of prejudice; (2) the defense of dwelling instruction was not applicable to the facts of this case, and it was not clearly erroneous to fail to give that instruction; and (3) it was error not to give the lesser included offense instruction on severity level seven aggravated battery, but the failure to give the unrequested instruction was not clearly erroneous. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit reversible error in (1) denying Defendant's motion to compel a psychological examination of the victim; (2) denying Defendant's motion for a bill of particulars; (3) failing to give a limiting instruction after admitting evidence of Defendant's prior traffic offenses; and (4) denying Defendant's motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The Court also held that Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3511(a) does not present an alternative means of committing the crime of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, and therefore, this case did not involve an alternative means issue. Lastly, the district court had jurisdiction to enter the restitution portion of Defendant's sentence. View "State v. Rojas-Marceleno" on Justia Law

Defendant sought review of the court of appeals' decision affirming his convictions for second-degree murder, kidnapping, and other crimes related to the beating death of his longtime companion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in holding that the trial court violated Defendant's right of confrontation by admitting the victim's testimonial statements to the police into evidence, but (2) the court of appeals erred in holding that the error was harmless. The court of appeals, however, did not have the advantage of caselaw that was available after the court of appeals decided the case. Pursuant to the subsequently decided State v. Ward, the error in this case was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Belone" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and four counts of aggravated assault. Defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution as an adult because he was not initially charged in juvenile court and the State never obtained authorization to prosecute him as an adult. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding, inter alia, (1) Defendant did not demonstrate he was denied his right to a speedy trial; (2) the district court did not err in allowing into evidence statements made at the previous trial because vacating the earlier trial did not render the sworn testimony from that trial void, did not remove the constitutional protections in place at that trial, and did not change the credibility of the testimony; and (3) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing arguments. View "State v. Breedlove" on Justia Law

After Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor theft in municipal court for violating a city ordinance, his conviction was vacated and he was charged with and convicted of felony theft in state district court for the same offense. Defendant argued that double jeopardy attached to the municipal court proceeding. The State countered that jeopardy did not attach to the municipal court proceeding because the municipal court did not have jurisdiction over felony theft. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy did not attach, as (1) a city ordinance that conflicts with a state statute by classifying the offense as a misdemeanor when the legislature has classified the crime as a felony does not vest the municipal court with jurisdiction; and (2) the municipal court had the authority to vacate Defendant's plea, and the State could prosecute Defendant for felony theft. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law