Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted for aggravated criminal sodomy, furnishing alcohol to a minor for an illicit purpose, and endangering a child. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for review in part to clarify whether a nurse's testimony about hospital laboratory results was testimonial in nature within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record contained no findings as to the primary purpose of the hospital technician's laboratory report, and that absence precluded the Court from a proper review on the right of confrontation issue; (2) Defendant's argument that the jury's verdict on the charge of endangering a child was legally inadequate because the State presented evidence of three alternative means for committing the offense, two of which were legally insufficient, was without merit; (3) the omission of a lesser included offense instruction on simple criminal sodomy was not erroneous; and (4) the use of Appellant's prior convictions in his criminal history score to enhance his sentences without requiring the State to prove the convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt was not error. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Appellant sought review of the court of appeals' decision affirming his conviction and sentence for felony DUI. Appellant's primary argument was that the district court violated the Confrontation Clause by admitting into evidence the certificate of calibration for the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine used to determine the level of alcohol in Appellant's breath without requiring the person who completed the certificate to testify in person at Appellant's trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the certificate of calibration was not testimonial in nature, and therefore, its admission did not violate Appellant's right of confrontation; and (2) in accordance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, Appellant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated wen the district court imposed an enhanced sentence, based on prior convictions, without proving those convictions to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Benson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of nonresidential burglary, theft, vehicular burglary, and conspiracy to commit nonresidential burglary. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State's error in its allegation of a specific overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy in Defendant's complaint did not constitute reversible error based on an argument of insufficient evidence; (2) the district court erred in denying Defendant's request for an accomplice jury instruction, but the error was harmless; (3) the use of Defendant's prior convictions in his criminal history score to enhance his sentences without requiring the history to be included in the complaint and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights; and (4) the district court did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by sentencing him to the aggravated terms of incarceration within the applicable sentencing grid boxes for each of his convictions. View "State v. Tapia" on Justia Law

This case began when the attorney general signed a delegation of authority to the assistant attorney general. The assistant attorney general then appeared before the district court judge pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 75-710 and applied for an order authorizing interception of wire communications and electronic communications pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2516. The judge authorized the requested interception. The investigation led to the prosecution of Defendant. Upon a motion by Defendant, the district court suppressed the evidence derived from the wiretap, holding that the application and order authorizing interception were fatally defective and the evidence thereby was unlawfully intercepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 75-710 when read in conjunction with Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-2515(a)(1)-(2) to permit the attorney general to delegate the power to apply for a wiretap order to an assistant attorney general was more permissive than 18 U.S.C. 2616(2) and thus preempted; and (2) a wiretap order obtained under such a delegation violates a central provision of the federal statutory scheme, and the evidence obtained or derived from the wiretap must be suppressed. View "State v. Bruce" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his Jessica's Law convictions for rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties. Defendant argued (1) all three convictions must be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt on each of the alternative means for committing the crime on which the jury was instructed; (2) three separate statements by the prosecutor constituted misconduct; (3) his life sentence violated the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated the imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision, holding (1) none of the complained of jury instructions included alternative means; (2) while one of the complained of statements by the prosecutor was improper, the error was not reversible; (3) Defendant's sentence did not violate the Constitution; but (4) the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

Defendant directly appealed his convictions for premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court erred in denying Defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruction on second-degree murder without first analyzing the propriety of giving the instruction, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court's error in failing to give an Allen-type jury instruction was not reversible; (3) the district court's denial of Defendant's new trial motion was not an abuse of discretion; (4) the district exercised its discretion in an appropriate manner in admitting certain photographs into evidence; (5) the district court did not err in finding that the evidence failed to establish a reason to believe that Defendant was mentally retarded; and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors was not so great as to require reversal. View "State v. Backus" on Justia Law

Defendant's convictions for first-degree felony murder and aggravated burglary were reversed by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for a new trial. Upon retrial, the jury convicted Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by assessing attorney fees against Defendant without adequately assessing his ability to pay or the burden such a payment would impose. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant's convictions; and (2) vacated the Board of Indigents' Defense Services attorney fees reimbursement order, holding that the district court erred by failing to ascertain Defendant's financial resources or the burden such reimbursement would cause him. Remanded. View "State v. Wade" on Justia Law

Appellant shot the Miguel Moya after robbing two people at gunpoint at the same house. A jury convicted Appellant of first-degree felony murder, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison, with a mandatory minimum of twenty years and lifetime postrelease supervision for the felony murder conviction. Appellant raised five issues on appeal. The Supreme Court decided all issues against Appellant except his sentencing argument, holding that the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to lifetime postrelease supervision rather than to a term with the possibility of parole, and accordingly, this portion of Appellant's sentence was vacated. View "State v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4904(b), sex offenders must inform their local law enforcement agency within ten days of changing their address of residence. Defendant, a registered sex offender, left his residence on June 1. He then traveled the southwest United States for approximately three weeks before settling in Nevada and registering as an offender on July 9. Defendant was convicted of one count of failing to notify the county sheriff within ten days of changing his residence - for the period of June 1-11. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Defendant's argument that he had not yet established a new residence and therefore had no duty to register during that ten-day period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that between June 1-11, Defendant never adopted a "place of habitation," to which, whenever he was absent, he had "the intention of returning." Accordingly, during that time period, Defendant did not "change the address of his residence" to a "new address" and therefore, Defendant was not required to register under section 22-4904(b). View "State v. LeClair" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sodomy and two counts of aggravated liberties with a child. Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences, each with a mandatory forty-year prison term. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the jury was improperly instructed with inaccurate and misleading language used in an Allen-type instruction; (2) the prosecutor improperly appealed to the emotions of the jurors by asking them to protect child victims by supporting their version of the events; (3) the judge improperly responded to a jury question by informing the jury that the abuse had happened more than once; and (4) these cumulative errors prejudiced Defendant and denied him a fair trial. View "State v. Burns" on Justia Law