Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) it was error for the district judge not to give a second-degree intentional murder instruction, but Defendant's failure to object or otherwise call the judge's attention to this error in the district court placed upon him a burden he could not bear, as the judge's failure to so instruct was not clearly erroneous; (2) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his aggravated kidnapping conviction; (3) the district court did not err in its instruction on aggravated robbery; and (4) the Kansas hard 50 sentencing scheme was constitutional. View "State v. Haberlein" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two criminal charges. The court placed Defendant on probation, but his probation was subsequently revoked. Defendant appealed, arguing that his attorney's position as the guardian ad litem for the victim of one of Defendant's crimes created a per se conflict of interest that denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation proceeding. Relying on State v. Jenkins, Defendant argued this conflict so offended his rights that reversal was automatic and he was not required to show the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation. The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mickens v. Taylor, the court held (1) Defendant had to show the multiple representation had an adverse effect on the attorney's representation because Defendant did not object to the multiple representation; and (2) Defendant did not meet his burden and was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mickens overrules portions of Jenkins; (2) the lower court correctly concluded that Defendant must establish that the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation; but (3) this determination cannot be made on the record on appeal. Remanded. View "State v. Galaviz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1989 of aggravated sodomy, indecent liberties with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child. More than a decade later, while Petitioner was still imprisoned on these convictions, he was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2005, Petitioner petitioned for discharge or transitional release. Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to show probable cause that his mental abnormality had changed to the extent that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a de novo standard of review applied to the court's denial of Petitioner's petition; (2) Petitioner bore the burden of proof in this case; and (3) Petitioner here failed to establish the requisite probable cause entitling him to a full evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge or transitional release. View "In re Burch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving while suspended (DWS). The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district court violated his due process rights and his right to present his defense by interfering with a defense witness' decision to testify, (2) DWS is an alternative means crime, and (3) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the alternative means of committing DUI and DWS. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not substantially interfere with a defense witness' choice to testify or violate Defendant's constitutional right to present a defense; (2) DWS is not an alternative means crime; and (3) Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567(a) does not contain alternative means of committing DUI, and the State presented sufficient proof to sustain Defendant's conviction for DUI. View "State v. Suter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and felony murder. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district judge erred in admitting evidence of other crimes and in giving a cautionary accomplice witness instruction over a defense objection, (2) the prosecution engaged in misconduct requiring reversal, (3) the cumulative effect of these errors required reversal, and (4) his convictions and sentences were multiplicitous. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting the disputed evidence and in instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor's repeated references to the "truth" during closing argument did constitute misconduct, but the error was harmless; (3) and Defendant's multiplicity argument was without merit. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, concluding that evidence of an attempt to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the State charged him with alternative means of committing DUI, the jury was instructed on both means, and the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish both means on which the jury was instructed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals' determination that the phrase "operate or attempt to operate" in Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1564(a) creates alternative means of committing a crime, thus holding that the State is not required to prove both sets of factual circumstances; and (2) affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the State presented sufficient proof that Defendant operated the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. View "State v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of DUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict because the State charged him with, and the jury was instructed on, alternative means of committing DUI, i.e., operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, but the State failed to present evidence sufficient to show he attempted to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed Defendant's DUI conviction but under different reasoning, holding (1) the legislature did not intend the phrase "operate or attempt to operate" to create alternative means of committing the crime of DUI, and the court of appeals erred in finding otherwise; (2) the district court's inclusion of that phrase in the charging instructions in this case did not create a jury unanimity problem; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Ahrens" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated intimidation of a victim. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Defendant sought review, claiming that the State erred in failing to present sufficient evidence to support the alternative means of committing the crime of aggravated intimidation of a witness under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3833, and the error required reversal of his conviction for this crime pursuant to State v. Wright. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3832, which defines the crime of intimidation of a witness, does not contain the alternative means alleged by Defendant; (2) the statutory definition of malice does not create alternative means; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant attempted to prevent or dissuade his victim from reporting his crimes and that he acted with the requisite malice in doing so. View "State v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of rape, one count of aggravated criminal sodomy, and one count of aggravated endangering a child. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments during his closing argument did not improperly prejudice the jury against Appellant as to deny her a fair trial; (2) the jury was not instructed on alternative means of committing aggravated criminal sodomy; (3) the district court properly limited cross-examination of S.W.; (4) the court, by answering a jury question with a written note, did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of her trial; (5) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion requesting a departure sentence; and (6) the court did not err by setting twenty-five years' imprisonment as the minimum prison term Appellant must serve before becoming eligible for parole. View "State v. Wells" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of rape and one count of aggravated criminal sodomy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Appellant's motion to conduct separate trials for him and his codefendant; (2) the court did not err when it denied Appellant's request for a psychological evaluation of S.W., the complaining witness; (3) the court properly limited cross-examination of S.W.; (4) the district court did not err in failing to strike a juror for cause; (5) the court did not err by admitting into evidence three of S.W.'s drawings; (6) the jury was not instructed on alternative means of committing aggravated criminal sodomy; (7) the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of the crimes for which he was convicted; (8) the prosecutor's comments during his closing argument did not improperly prejudice the jury against Appellant as to deny him a fair trial; and (9) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion requesting a departure sentence. View "State v. Stafford" on Justia Law