Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At the conclusion of Defendant's seizure pursuant to a traffic stop, law enforcement officers returned to Defendant's car and asked him if they could search the vehicle. Defendant consented to the search of the car. The officers subsequently found crack cocaine in the trunk. Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of cocaine without a tax stamp. At issue on appeal was whether the traffic stop leading to Defendant's arrest became a voluntary encounter before Defendant gave consent to search. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction, holding that Defendant gave his consent to search his vehicle during a voluntary encounter with the officer. View "State v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, among other crimes. Law enforcement officers found drug evidence on Defendant after they seized him under the suspicion that he knew the whereabouts of someone for whom police had a warrant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers conducted an unlawful investigatory stop without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and was convicted of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted, as the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity before they initiated the stop, and therefore, the seizure was illegal. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was (1) whether a driver's favorable results from field sobriety tests administered prior to a request for a preliminary breath test (PBT) dissipate the reasonable suspicion statutorily required to support a request for a PBT, and (2) whether the investigating officer in this case substantially complied with Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1012(c), which requires oral notice that refusal to take a PBT is a traffic infraction, when the officer incorrectly told Defendant he had not right to refuse the PBT. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) sobriety tests administered prior to a PBT request are part of the totality of circumstances examined by a court when determining whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the PBT request under section 8-1012(c); and (2) the officer in this case failed to comply with the notice requirements in section 8-1012(c) by incorrectly informing Defendant that he had no right to refuse the PBT. Remanded. View "State v. Edgar" on Justia Law

This capital murder case resulted from a double homicide and shooting of a third victim. After a trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant appealed, claiming he was denied his right to a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court (1) reversed the death sentence where the State stipulated that Defendant's attorney was ineffective during the trial's penalty phase; and (2) affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that defense counsel was deficient in certain areas, but that there was no evidence that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different without these deficiencies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's representation denied Defendant his right to a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Cheatham" on Justia Law

Three corporations, each of which owned a nursing home facility, requested a hearing with the Kansas Department on Aging, challenging new reimbursement rates for each facility, arguing that because the facilities underwent a change of ownership, the rates should be recalculated. The hearing officer rejected the corporations' arguments, finding that, by operation of law for Medicaid reimbursement purposes, there was no change of ownership. The Kansas Health Policy Authority upheld the ruling, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agency orders were valid, did not violate equal protection or due process, and were not vague. View "Village Villa v. Kan. Health Policy Auth." on Justia Law

This eminent domain proceeding involved City's condemnation of a tract of land owned by Landowner. Company leased from Landowner approximately 500 square feet of the property for operation of a billboard. The tract was valued at $1,075,600 with no compensation given for the billboard structure and no consideration as to the advertising income produced by Company's leasehold. City and Landowner accepted the appraisers' award, but Company appealed. The district court granted City's motion for summary judgment and affirmed the appraisers' award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for City, as (1) evidence of advertising income generated by the billboard was irrelevant to the value of the property under any authorized valuation approach; and (2) Company did not come forward with relevant and admissible evidence that could alter the appraisers' valuation of the land at issue. View "City of Wichita v. Denton" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child for touching the faces, hair, arms, and legs of two young girls, who were playing outside a movie theater. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years. At issue on appeal was whether the State presented sufficient evidence of a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), which provides that aggravated indecent liberties with a child is engaging in any lewd fondling or touching of a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the touches did not tend to undermine the children's morals and were not so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, the evidence against Defendant was insufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Ta" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) it was error for the district judge not to give a second-degree intentional murder instruction, but Defendant's failure to object or otherwise call the judge's attention to this error in the district court placed upon him a burden he could not bear, as the judge's failure to so instruct was not clearly erroneous; (2) Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his aggravated kidnapping conviction; (3) the district court did not err in its instruction on aggravated robbery; and (4) the Kansas hard 50 sentencing scheme was constitutional. View "State v. Haberlein" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two criminal charges. The court placed Defendant on probation, but his probation was subsequently revoked. Defendant appealed, arguing that his attorney's position as the guardian ad litem for the victim of one of Defendant's crimes created a per se conflict of interest that denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation proceeding. Relying on State v. Jenkins, Defendant argued this conflict so offended his rights that reversal was automatic and he was not required to show the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation. The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mickens v. Taylor, the court held (1) Defendant had to show the multiple representation had an adverse effect on the attorney's representation because Defendant did not object to the multiple representation; and (2) Defendant did not meet his burden and was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mickens overrules portions of Jenkins; (2) the lower court correctly concluded that Defendant must establish that the conflict had an adverse effect on his attorney's representation; but (3) this determination cannot be made on the record on appeal. Remanded. View "State v. Galaviz" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1989 of aggravated sodomy, indecent liberties with a child, and sexual exploitation of a child. More than a decade later, while Petitioner was still imprisoned on these convictions, he was found to be a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). In 2005, Petitioner petitioned for discharge or transitional release. Following a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to show probable cause that his mental abnormality had changed to the extent that he was safe to be placed in transitional release. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a de novo standard of review applied to the court's denial of Petitioner's petition; (2) Petitioner bore the burden of proof in this case; and (3) Petitioner here failed to establish the requisite probable cause entitling him to a full evidentiary hearing on his petition for discharge or transitional release. View "In re Burch" on Justia Law