Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated indecent liberties for his conduct with his third-grade stepdaughter. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive Jessica's Law hard twenty-five life sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) rape is not an alternative means crime, and the court's instructions to the jury on rape were sufficient; (2) aggravated indecent liberties is not an alternative means crime, and the court's instructions to the jury on aggravated indecent liberties were sufficient; (3) Defendant's sentence for rape was proportional under section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; and (4) Defendant's sentence for aggravated indecent liberties was proportional under section 9. View "State v. Newcomb" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, capital murder, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Defendant later filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, requesting that his capital murder conviction be reversed because the complaint did not list the names of both individuals whose deaths served as the basis for the capital murder charge. The district court summarily denied Defendant's petition. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the summary denial of Defendant's motion because a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504 cannot be used to collaterally challenge a conviction; and (2) denied Defendant's request to treat the motion as a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507. View "State v. Trotter" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child under fourteen years of age and one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in admitting (1) evidence of his previous conviction for attempted aggravated incest of his daughter under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455, and (2) a videotaped interview in which Defendant contended detectives implied he was not being truthful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant's previous conviction for attempted aggravated incest, but the error was harmless; and (2) Defendant's second argument was not properly before the Court. View "State v. Longstaff" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery. Counts I and II were a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3414(a)(2)(A) and Count III was a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3414(a)(2)(B), which prohibits "recklessly causing bodily harm...to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted." Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in requiring Defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his use-of-force was justified in defense of others or property other than a dwelling pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3219, but this error was harmless; (2) the Kansas Legislature did not state alternative means of committing aggravated battery under the aggravated battery statute; (3) the district court did not err by giving a unanimity instruction; and (4) while the district court may have erred in denying Defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses regarding why they did not honor their subpoenas, the error was harmless. View "State v. Ultreras" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and criminal possession of a firearm. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion for postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court determined that Appellant would participate by telephone at the evidentiary hearing and refused to allow him to physically appear at the hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A majority of the court of appeals panel reversed, holding that Appellant had to be physically present for the proceedings and that the district court had no discretion to order otherwise. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals because its decision stripped district courts of the discretion they lawfully have; but (2) reversed the district court's judgment because the record on appeal was inadequate for the Court to conclude whether the district court abused that discretion. Remanded. View "Fischer v. State" on Justia Law

After Ian Burch's motor home was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, the trooper found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and $15,000 in cash in the vehicle. The State filed criminal charges against Burch. The district court found the trooper had unlawfully extended the scope and length of the stop and suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle. The charges against Burch were later dismissed. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently issued a tax assessment notice indicating Burch owed $17,761 in taxes and penalties on the drugs found in his motor home. The Court of Tax Appeals (COTA) granted summary judgment to KDOR on its assessment of taxes and civil penalties against Burch under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA erred in granting summary judgment to KDOR because it failed to consider and apply the exclusionary rule to the drugs upon which the taxes were assessed. Remanded to COTA for consideration of the exclusionary rule. View "In re Tax Appeal of Burch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and violation of a protection order. The State elicited evidence of multiple acts that would support the violation of a protection order charge, but it failed to elect one particular act upon which the jury could rely. The district court did not give the jury a unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the particular act that would support a conviction on the protection order charge, nor did Defendant request a unanimity instruction or object to its omission. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the unanimity error to be harmless because Defendant presented a unified defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to give a unanimity instruction was not clearly erroneous under the facts of this case. View "State v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Defendant appealed, arguing in part that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements and a drawing he provided law enforcement officers. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the State did not carry its burden to show Defendant's confessions and drawing were given voluntarily under the Fifth Amendment, and thus the trial court violated Defendant's right to remain silent; and (2) the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded. View "State v. Swindler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and three counts of forgery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on direct appeal but reversed and remanded his hard fifty prison term for the first-degree murder conviction because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when imposing it. On remand, the district court found three aggravating factors were established by a preponderance of the evidence and re-imposed a hard fifty sentence, holding that any one of the aggravating factors outweighed the court's finding in mitigation that the victim physically abused Defendant as a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the hard fifty sentence under these facts. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to twenty-six counts of sexual exploitation of a child. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a downward durational and/or dispositional departure motion, asking the court to depart from the presumptive prison term based on seven mitigating factors. The district court considered each mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing and denied the motion, finding that the mitigating factors were not substantial and compelling. Defendant was sentenced to a hard twenty-five life-imprisonment sentence. With the exception of vacating a portion of Defendant's sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's hard twenty-five life sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's departure motion; and (2) the postrelease lifetime supervision sentence imposed by the district court was illegal. View "State v. Floyd" on Justia Law