Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery. Counts I and II were a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3414(a)(2)(A) and Count III was a violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3414(a)(2)(B), which prohibits "recklessly causing bodily harm...to another person with a deadly weapon, or in any manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement or death can be inflicted." Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in requiring Defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his use-of-force was justified in defense of others or property other than a dwelling pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3219, but this error was harmless; (2) the Kansas Legislature did not state alternative means of committing aggravated battery under the aggravated battery statute; (3) the district court did not err by giving a unanimity instruction; and (4) while the district court may have erred in denying Defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses regarding why they did not honor their subpoenas, the error was harmless. View "State v. Ultreras" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, attempted rape, and criminal possession of a firearm. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 motion for postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court determined that Appellant would participate by telephone at the evidentiary hearing and refused to allow him to physically appear at the hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A majority of the court of appeals panel reversed, holding that Appellant had to be physically present for the proceedings and that the district court had no discretion to order otherwise. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals because its decision stripped district courts of the discretion they lawfully have; but (2) reversed the district court's judgment because the record on appeal was inadequate for the Court to conclude whether the district court abused that discretion. Remanded. View "Fischer v. State" on Justia Law

After Ian Burch's motor home was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, the trooper found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and $15,000 in cash in the vehicle. The State filed criminal charges against Burch. The district court found the trooper had unlawfully extended the scope and length of the stop and suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle. The charges against Burch were later dismissed. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently issued a tax assessment notice indicating Burch owed $17,761 in taxes and penalties on the drugs found in his motor home. The Court of Tax Appeals (COTA) granted summary judgment to KDOR on its assessment of taxes and civil penalties against Burch under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA erred in granting summary judgment to KDOR because it failed to consider and apply the exclusionary rule to the drugs upon which the taxes were assessed. Remanded to COTA for consideration of the exclusionary rule. View "In re Tax Appeal of Burch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and violation of a protection order. The State elicited evidence of multiple acts that would support the violation of a protection order charge, but it failed to elect one particular act upon which the jury could rely. The district court did not give the jury a unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the particular act that would support a conviction on the protection order charge, nor did Defendant request a unanimity instruction or object to its omission. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the unanimity error to be harmless because Defendant presented a unified defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to give a unanimity instruction was not clearly erroneous under the facts of this case. View "State v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Defendant appealed, arguing in part that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements and a drawing he provided law enforcement officers. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the State did not carry its burden to show Defendant's confessions and drawing were given voluntarily under the Fifth Amendment, and thus the trial court violated Defendant's right to remain silent; and (2) the erroneous admission of this evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded. View "State v. Swindler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and three counts of forgery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on direct appeal but reversed and remanded his hard fifty prison term for the first-degree murder conviction because the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when imposing it. On remand, the district court found three aggravating factors were established by a preponderance of the evidence and re-imposed a hard fifty sentence, holding that any one of the aggravating factors outweighed the court's finding in mitigation that the victim physically abused Defendant as a child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the hard fifty sentence under these facts. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to twenty-six counts of sexual exploitation of a child. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a downward durational and/or dispositional departure motion, asking the court to depart from the presumptive prison term based on seven mitigating factors. The district court considered each mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing and denied the motion, finding that the mitigating factors were not substantial and compelling. Defendant was sentenced to a hard twenty-five life-imprisonment sentence. With the exception of vacating a portion of Defendant's sentence imposing lifetime postrelease supervision, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's hard twenty-five life sentence, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's departure motion; and (2) the postrelease lifetime supervision sentence imposed by the district court was illegal. View "State v. Floyd" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of possession of drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. The drugs and paraphernalia were first observed in Defendant's apartment by a public housing employee who had made an uninvited entry into the apartment to check for potential damage from a sewer back-up at the facility. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements and the drug-related evidence as being products of an unlawful search and seizure. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a public housing employee was not a government actor subject to the constitutional restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the public housing employees that entered Defendant's apartment in reaction to a maintenance problem were not government actors within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. View "State v. Brittingham" on Justia Law

After entering into a plea agreement with the State, Defendant entered no contest pleas to numerous crimes in exchange for the State's promise to recommend at sentencing that the district court impose a controlling term of 102 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement by making negative comments at sentencing that undermined the parties' recommendation of a 102-month prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's sentences. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence, holding (1) the prosecutor's comments at sentencing effectively undermined her sentencing recommendation to the district court, thereby violating the State's plea agreement with Defendant; and (2) this error was not harmless. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Urista" on Justia Law

After digital photographs of children engaged in sexual acts were found on Defendant's work computer, Defendant pleaded no contest to attempted sexual exploitation of a child. The district court imposed a fifty-two year sentence of imprisonment, with lifetime postrelease supervision. Defendant appealed, contending that the State violated the plea agreement by failing to remain silent at sentencing. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecutor was not required to "stand silent at sentencing" and that her statements were permissible to correct factual misstatements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor's questions challenging factual misstatements were appropriate and did not violate the plea agreement; but (2) the prosecutor's comment about Defendant's likelihood of recidivism violated the State's plea agreement promise to stand silent. Remanded. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law