Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the aggravated robbery was accomplished by "threat of bodily harm" as specifically charged; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, as the prosecutor's comment about Defendant's attorney did not rise to prejudicial intentional misconduct; and (3) the language in the felony-murder statute does not create alternative means of committing the crime. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of arson, three counts of criminal threat, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, assault, battery, and domestic battery. The Supreme Court (1) reversed two of Defendant's convictions for criminal threat, holding that there can be only one conviction for a single communicated threat regardless of the number of victims who perceive and comprehend the threat; (2) reversed Defendant's conviction for felony criminal damage to property where (i) the evidence established multiple acts, and (ii) the trial court failed to instruct the jury it had to unanimously agree on the act that supported the conviction; and (3) otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court committed two other errors, but there errors were harmless when considered both individually and cumulatively. View "State v. King" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for second-degree unintentional murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing argument, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court properly refused to instruct the jury on self-defense; (3) the district court did not err in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting; (4) the district court did not err in excluding specific evidence of a witness' plea bargain; (5) the identical offense sentencing doctrine did not require reversing and remanding for resentencing; and (7) the district court did not err in including Defendant's prior convictions in her criminal history score without requiring a jury to prove their validity. View "State v. Friday" on Justia Law

After a consolidated jury trial on two homicide cases against Defendant, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting the State's motion to consolidate the two cases for trial after finding that the crimes were of the same or similar character; (2) did not err in allowing the jury to decide whether eyewitness identification evidence was reliable under the totality of the circumstances even though the identification procedure used by the police was unnecessarily suggestive; (3) incorrectly instructed the jury on eyewitness identification testimony, but the error did not prejudice Defendant; and (4) did not err in admitting gang evidence. Lastly, the errors in this proceeding did not deny Defendant his right to a fair trial. View "State v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with and convicted of unintentional reckless second-degree murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to 117 months' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) district court did not deny Defendant his right to present his theory of defense by refusing to admit Defendant's expert witness testimony; (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to investigators; (3) Defendant's argument that witnesses inappropriately commented on his credibility was not preserved for appeal; (4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument, but the error was harmless; (5) the identical offense sentencing doctrine did not require reversing and remanding for resentencing; and (7) the district court did not err in applying a Board of Indigents' Defense application fee. View "State v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. Within one year of the resentencing hearing but more than one year after remand, Defendant filed a motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the motion as untimely filed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the time limitation under section 60-1507 began ten days after resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, Defendant's motion was timely. Remanded. View "Baker v. State " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a prisoner, was convicted of criminal threat for yelling at a pizza delivery person. The jury trial was held before Judge John McNally, who had presided over three cases involving Defendant. Defendant sought Judge McNally's recusal, but Judge McNally declined to recuse. After his conviction, Defendant appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the probability of actual bias in this case was too high to be tolerable under the due process clause; and (2) the judge did not err in giving the jury a permissive inference instruction. View "State v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy. During the trial, the victim testified that Defendant had a scar on his penis. Defendant appealed, claiming that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek a continuance to obtain evidence to rebut the existence of the scar. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's counsel's assistance was deficient but that Defendant was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel's unconstitutionally ineffective assistance denied Defendant the opportunity to impeach the victim's credibility by rebutting her testimony about his alleged penile scar, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, denied Defendant a fair trial, and created a reasonable probability that the trial would have been different but for counsel's unprofessional errors. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of introducing a controlled substance into a correctional facility after marijuana was found in his socks. Defendant requested that he be given a departure sentence because the amount of marijuana he possessed was very small. The district court concluded that it could not consider a lesser sentence on that basis and sentenced Defendant to an additional 122 months in prison. The court of appeals vacated the sentence, holding (1) the district court could have given Defendant a downward departure sentence because possession of a small quantity of drugs constitutes a valid factor upon which a departure sentence may be entered on a prison-contraband conviction, but the court incorrectly refused to consider the possibility because it misinterpreted a sentencing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the court of appeals was correct in its reasoning and judgment. View "State v. Warren" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape and attempted rape and sentenced to two terms of life in prison without parole as an aggravated habitual sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted rape and vacated the remaining rape conviction, holding (1) Defendant's convictions for rape and attempted rape were multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights; (2) the reversal of the attempted rape conviction rendered moot Defendant's challenge to the jury instruction on that count; (3) rape is not an alternative means crime; and (4) the aggravated habitual sex offender provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-4642 are constitutional. Remanded for a determination of whether the State established that Defendant meets the statutory definition of an aggravated habitual sex offender under section 21-4642. View "State v. Weber" on Justia Law