Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for parole for fifty years. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the state’s hard fifty sentencing scheme was constitutional. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Following its decision in Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court vacated the Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Alleyne. On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when it imposed the hard fifty sentence. View "State v. Astorga" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct in two statements made during closing argument, but the misconduct did not deny Defendant a fair trial; (2) the trial court did not clearly err in failing to instruct the jury on unintentional but reckless second-degree murder; (3) the trial court did not err in its remaining instructions to the jury; (4) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no factual support for Defendant’s motions for mistrial; (5) the cumulative errors did not deny Defendant a fair trial; and (6) the district court had jurisdiction to award restitution after judgment was pronounced at sentencing. View "State v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with thirteen felonies. On the morning trial was set to begin, Defendant’s counsel orally renewed a motion to withdraw at Defendant’s request. The district judge denied the motion. Defendant subsequently decided to change his plea from not guilty to no contest to one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. The district judge accepted the pleas. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his pleas, which the district court denied. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district judge denied his right to counsel by hearing the motion to withdraw plea without appointing a new lawyer for him. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, when Defendant filed his motion to withdraw plea, the district judge failed to give due consideration to whether Defendant was represented by competent counsel. In fact, neither Defendant’s counsel nor the district judge communicated all of the appeal rights Defendant would surrender as a matter of law by entering his no contest pleas, and “failure to follow the law is an abuse of discretion.” Remanded. View "State v. Kenney" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated kidnapping. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (i) Defendant’s claim that his preliminary hearing counsel had a conflict of interest was without merit; (ii) Defendant’s argument that his trial court’s admission into evidence of his prior sex crimes for propensity purposes was not preserved for appeal; (iii) the jury was properly instructed and sufficient evidence supported the aiding-and-abetting rape conviction; (iv) the district court’s delivery of a written response to a jury question outside of Defendant’s presence was harmless error; and (2) vacated the portion of Defendant’s sentence ordering him not to have contact with his codefendants or the victim, holding that the district court exceeded its authority in imposing this portion of the sentence, and affirmed the remainder of Defendant’s sentence. View "State v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with, among other offenses, fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer by driving recklessly, and driving with a suspended license. A week before trial, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based upon the alleged violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion, emphasizing that most of the delay had been caused by Defendant’s absconding and his counsel’s requests for trial continuances. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the State did not violate Defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial. View "State v. Sievers" on Justia Law

Police officer Ricky Ritter observed a blue pickup truck traveling without its headlights on. Defendant was driving a red pickup truck behind the blue pickup truck, and a van was following Defendant. Ritter pulled his squad car behind the three vehicles and activated his emergency lights, intending to stop only the blue truck, but all three vehicles pulled over. Defendant left his truck cab and approached Ritter’s squad car, demanding that Ritter explain why he had been pulled over. Defendant eventually returned to his truck, but, believing Defendant was under the influence of alcohol, Ritter asked Defendant to take a field sobriety test. Defendant failed the test and was eventually convicted of DUI. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop because he was unlawfully seized, tainting the evidence and requiring its suppression. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted because Defendant’s seizure was unlawful, and all evidence obtained after the unlawful seizure was therefore tainted. View "State v. Reiss" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions but vacated the lifetime postrelease supervision portion of Defendant’s life sentence, holding (1) the trial court erred in failing to give an accomplice witness cautionary instruction and in including a degree of certainty factor in its eyewitness identification instruction, but neither error was reversible as clear error; (2) certain comments made by the prosecutor did not constitute misconduct; (3) cumulative error did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or require reversal; but (4) the trial court erred in including lifetime postrelease supervision as part of Defendant’s life sentence. View "State v. Todd " on Justia Law

Two police officers and two training officers entered a locked apartment without a warrant to assist Defendant, who was lying unresponsive on the couch. Once Defendant was awake and clearly not needing emergency medical assistance, the officers began a criminal investigation. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, and felony use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence obtained as a result of the officers' warrantless entry. The district court granted the motion, holding (1) the officers’ initial entry was permitted under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, but (2) the officers’ ensuing search was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the officers unreasonably exceeded the permissible scope of their warrantless entry. In so holding, the Supreme Court realigned its previous Kansas test for applying the emergency aid exception with more recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. View "State v. Neighbors" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. Before trial, the State moved for a determination as to the admissibility of Defendant’s inculpatory statements to police. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Defendant had the opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of the statements. The district court allowed the statements to be admitted. After he was convicted and sentenced, Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police, and (2) structural error occurred when he was not allowed to testify in support of his motion to reconsider the trial court’s earlier ruling that his statements to police were voluntarily given. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Defendant’s statements to the police were voluntary and knowingly given; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant a second opportunity to testify and his request proffer his testimony at the motion to reconsider. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences in two cases. The first case, which was tried to a jury, involved sex offenses against a thirteen-year-old, and the second case arose from an unrelated incident involving burglary and theft that was tried to the bench on stipulated facts while the jury in the first case deliberated. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in both cases, holding (1) prosecutor improperly opined on the credibility of a witness during the trial on the sex crime charges, but the mistake did not require reversal of Defendant’s sex crime convictions; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel did not provide him with ineffective assistance; (3) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s sex crime convictions; and (4) Defendant’s argument that the district court’s failure to make on-the-record findings on Defendant’s departure motion rendered his sentences in the burglary and theft case illegal was without merit. View "State v. Dull" on Justia Law