Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Defendant was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI). The charge was based upon a 2002 DUI diversion and a 2004 DUI conviction. Defendant filed a motion to strike the diversion from consideration of his criminal history and a discharge from the felony charges. The district court granted the motion and excluded Defendant’s 2002 DUI diversion from his criminal history. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Defendant’s 2002 DUI diversion could properly be counted as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes because Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach during the 2002 diversion proceedings. The court also found that although Defendant had a statutory right to counsel during the diversion proceedings, the diversion agreement that Defendant signed showed that he had validly waived this statutory right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that counting Defendant’s 2002 diversion as a prior DUI conviction for purposes of classifying and sentencing him for his current DUI conviction did not violate his constitutional or statutory right to counsel, as (1) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel never attached during the diversion proceedings; and (2) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory right to counsel during the DUI diversion proceedings. View "State v. Tims" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State violated Defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial, but the error did not require reversal; (2) the district judge did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; (3) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; (4) the district judge did not err by denying Defendant a mistrial or a new trial based on improper testimony by State witnesses, as Defendant failed to establish substantial prejudice warranting a new trial in the interest of justice; and (5) cumulative error did not necessitate reversal. View "State v. Brownlee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree murder. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision as to whether the murder was premeditated or committed during the course of the robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err by instructing the jury that it could convict Defendant of first-degree murder based on the combined theories of premeditated and felony murder; (2) the jury was not precluded from convicting Defendant of first-degree murder based on both alternative means of felony and premeditated murder based on the prosecutor’s closing argument; and (3) the district court did not err by refusing to suppress items seized pursuant to a search warrant that was obtained with statements made by Defendant apart from his un-Mirandized confessions. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Robert Dumler was arrested for driving under the influence and transported to the sheriff’s office. On several occasions before a breath alcohol test was administered Dumler requested that he be permitted to confer with an attorney. The requesting officer never gave Dumler an opportunity to confer with an attorney, and Dumler did not repeat his request for an attorney after he failed his breath test. The suspension of Dumler’s driving privileges was upheld in administrative proceedings. Dumler petitioned the district court for review, arguing that his statutory right to counsel was violated. The district court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because Dumler did not ask to consult with an attorney after he failed to breath test, he had not invoked his statutory right to an attorney and, therefore, that right was not violated. The Supreme Court remanded with directions, holding (1) the district court applied an incorrect legal standard on the question of whether Dumler’s post-testing right to counsel was violated, and therefore, a remand was required; and (2) suppression of the alcohol testing result is the appropriate remedy for the denial of a driver’s statutory right to counsel. Remanded. View "Dumler v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and child abuse for shaking or roughly handling his two-month-old daughter. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the trial court’s admission under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 of prior instances where Defendant had shaken his daughter was not reversible; (2) the trial court did not commit clear error in giving a jury instruction that limited the jury’s consideration of evidence admitted under section 60-455; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing arguments but the error did not affect the verdict; (4) Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court improperly accepted the jury’s verdict under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3421; (5) the two instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not substantially prejudice Defendant; and (6) Defendant’s criminal history score did not need to be proven to a jury in order for it to affect his sentence. View "State v. Barber" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years and lifetime postrelease supervision for the aggravated indecent liberties conviction and to a concurrent term of 155 months’ imprisonment and lifetime postrelease supervision for the attempted aggravated indecent liberties conviction. The court of appeals vacated the lifetime postrelease supervision and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s argument that the district court erred in excluding certain evidence was not preserved for appellate review; (2) the aggravated indecent liberties statute does not create an alternative means crime; (3) the prosecutor’s comment during closing arguments that “Today, you have the power to say to [the victim], ‘We believe you’” was an impermissible attempt to engender sympathy for the victim, but the error was harmless; and (4) Defendant’s hard-twenty-five prison sentence is constitutional under the state and federal constitutions. View "State v. Swint" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated arson, and aggravated child endangerment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under the arson statute; (2) the arson statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant; (3) the prosecutor did not engage in impermissible misconduct during closing arguments; and (4) Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his argument that the trial court erred in admitting several out-of-court statements that the victim made in the days leading up to the fire. View "State v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder. The court of appeals affirmed. Both the State and Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant conviction but vacated his sentence, holding (1) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial did not attach to the questioning of the victim, and therefore, the closure of the courtroom for a hearing to determine whether the witness would testify did not violate Defendant’s right to a public trial; (2) trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (3) due to problems in the district judge’s decision to grant a downward durational departure, the case must be remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Reed" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned two unrelated cases. In the first case, Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and misdemeanor theft. Defendant was eighteen years old when the crimes were committed. In the second case, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant was seventeen years old when the crime was committed. The district court authorized Defendant to be prosecuted as an adult. The cases were consolidated for pleas and sentencings. The district court sentenced Defendant to terms of imprisonment and to a lifetime of supervision once he was released from prison. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for juveniles convicted of aggravated indecent liberties does not categorically constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for juveniles who have committed and are later convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child is categorically unconstitutional. View "State v. Dull" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol and speeding. Defendant appealed both convictions and sought a trial de novo in district court, arguing that the evidence was the product of an illegal traffic stop. Specifically, Defendant argued that the officer who initiated the traffic stop did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop because the officer was mistaken about the applicable speed limit where a traffic sign normally posting the limit had been knocked to the ground. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer made a mistake of fact about the speed limit, but the mistake was objectively reasonable. View "City of Atwood v. Pianalto" on Justia Law