Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the holdings of the lower courts in this case, holding that wages can be "earnings" under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-2310(a)(1) even after they are paid if the employee can specifically and directly identify the funds as wages.Plaintiff sued Defendant for $3,008, and Defendant consented to the judgment. At issue was a garnishment order issued under Kan. Stat. Ann. 61-3505(b)(1). Defendant objected to the garnishment, arguing that the funds in his bank account were "earnings" and could only be garnished under Kan. Stat. Ann. 61-3507. The district court and court of appeals ordered the bank to pay the withheld funds, concluding that Defendant's wages lost their status as "earnings" and could be garnished under section 61-3505 once his paycheck was deposited in his bank account. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) "paid" wages may in certain circumstances be deemed earnings for purposes of garnishment; and (2) this case must be remanded for further factual findings. View "Stormont-Vail Healthcare, Inc. v. Sievers" on Justia Law

This case arose from a mortgage foreclosure petition filed by FV-I, Inc. The dispute in this case was between FV-I and Bank of the Prairie (BOP), a bank with junior mortgages on the same property. The parties agreed to sell the property and place the proceeds in escrow pending resolution of this case. Summary judgment was initially granted in favor of BOP. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial to determine whether FV-I had possession of the promissory note underlying the mortgage at the time it filed the mortgage foreclosure. After a trial, the district court concluded that FV-I lacked standing to file the petition because it did not have possession of the original note prior to filing its petition and that BOP’s mortgages were superior to FV-I’s mortgage. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidentiary rulings excluding endorsements on the promissory note require a remand for a rehearing regarding standing and the panel’s priority determination. Remanded. View "FV-I, Inc. v. Kallevig" on Justia Law

Decedent created an inter vivos revocable trust. Until her death, Decedent served as the trust's sole trustee. At Decedent's request, Attorney drafted the trust documents and a pour-over will. Bank was named successor trustee of Decedent's trust. After Decedent died, the personal representative (Representative) of Decedent's estate sued Attorney and Bank. Against Attorney, the petition alleged claims of negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty and contract based on the alleged failure of Defendants to protect Decedent's assets from tax liability. The district court granted Defendants' motions of summary judgment. Specifically, the court held that Representative's tort claims for legal malpractice did not survive Decedent's death. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Representative's cause of action did not accrue until after Decedent's death, it did not qualify as a survival action under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1801 and was therefore barred. View "Jeanes v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law