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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant a third time for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery, holding that Defendant's second sentence was legally imposed, and this Court's subsequent decision in State v. Keel, 357 P.3d 251 (Kan. 2015), did not render that sentence illegal. In his first appeal, Defendant argued that the district court miscalculated his criminal history score when it classified his two out-of-state offenses as person crimes, which resulted in a criminal history score of A. The Supreme Court agreed. At resentencing, the district court followed the Supreme Court's mandate and scored Defendant's prior out-of-state convictions as nonperson felonies, resulting in a criminal history score of C. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Keel, which overruled State v. Murdock, 323 P.3d 846 (Kan. 2014). The State moved to correct Murdock's sentence, and the district court granted the motion, resentencing Defendant a third time and finding a criminal history score of A. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate Defendant's second sentence, holding that Defendant's second sentence was legal when pronounced, and Keel did not render Defendant's second sentence illegal. View "State v. Murdock" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's petition alleging that Defendants - medical providers and facilities - committed negligence and medical malpractice resulting in a patient's wrongful death, holding that Plaintiff failed to meet the evidentiary standard required when responding to a motion to dismiss with facts outside the pleadings. In dismissing Plaintiff's petition, the district court found that the petition was filed one day after the statute of limitations had expired. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her attorney electronically submitted the petition for filing before the statute of limitations ran and promptly responded when the petition was returned because of an electronic filing issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no evidence in the record supported Plaintiff's factual assertion that her counsel timely submitted the same petition as the one eventually file stamped by the clerk. Therefore, the Court could not reach the substance of Plaintiff's argument that a document is filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when uploaded to the electronic filing system rather than when the clerk of court accepts and file stamps it. View "Lambert v. Peterson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the summary denial of Defendant's pro se motion, which Defendant called a combined "motion to correct illegal sentence" and "motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction," holding that Defendant failed to establish that his sentence was illegal and that Defendant could not overcome the procedural hurdles of the motion being successive and filed outside the statutory time limit. In his combined motion, Defendant requested that his convictions be reversed, invoking Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3504 as the basis for jurisdiction. The district court summarily dismissed the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant cannot collaterally attack a conviction through a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed under section 22-3504 claiming that a defective complaint meant the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict; (2) the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's motion to dismiss; and (3) Defendant's motion could not be considered as one filed under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 because such a motion is procedurally barred. View "State v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Kansas Workers Compensation Board (Board) affirming an ALJ's denial of Helen Knoll's application for hearing with the Kansas Division of Workers Compensation (Division), holding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-523(f)(1) controlled Knoll's claim and required its dismissal. More than five years after Knoll filed her application with the Division, Employer moved to have Knoll's claim dismissed under section 44-523(f)(1) because the claim had not proceeded to a final hearing within three years of the filing of an application for hearing. The ALJ concluded that Knoll's motion for extension was timely and entered an award of compensation. The Board affirmed the ALJ's denial of the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that dismissal was appropriate because Knoll did not file a motion for extension within three years of filing her application for hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a workers compensation claimant filed an application for hearing under Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-534 after Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-523(f)(1) took effect in 2011, the 2011 statute governs the claim; and (2) because Knoll filed her application for hearing six months after the 2011 amendments became effective, section 44-523(f)(1) controlled her claim. View "Knoll v. Olathe School District No. 233" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for premeditated first-degree murder, holding that the district erred in denying Defendant's request for a self-defense instruction and that the error was not harmless. Defendant shot and killed a man following a dispute over a pool game. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction of premeditated first-degree murder for failure to give lesser included offenses instructions. After a retrial, Defendant was again found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that the evidence did not support a self-defense instruction. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Defendant's testimony sufficed to make the self-defense instruction factually appropriate and that the error in denying the instruction was not harmless. View "State v. Qualls" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Kansas Board of Workers Compensation concluding that Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-523(f)(1) unambiguously requires a claimant to move for extension within three years of filing an application for hearing for the claim to survive a proper motion to dismiss, holding that the statute unambiguously prohibits an ALJ from granting an extension unless a motion for extension has been filed within three years of filing the application for hearing. Appellant filed an application for hearing with the Kansas Division of Workers Compensation asserting that he fell and injured himself while working for Employer. Approximately three years later, Employer filed an application for dismissal, arguing that the ALJ should dismiss Appellant's claim under section 44-523(f) because Appellant had failed to move the claim toward a hearing or settlement within three years of filing his application for hearing. The ALJ granted Employer's application to dismiss. The Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute was correct. View "Glaze v. J.K. Willliams, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, holding that there was no error in the conduct of the trial and that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455, the statute allowing the introduction of evidence of propensity to commit sex crimes, is not unconstitutional. Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The trial court granted in part the State's motion to admit evidence of prior conduct under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455 in order to show Defendant's propensity to commit the offense, allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's Nebraska conviction of sexual assault on a nine-year-old neighbor girl. Defendant was subsequently convicted as charged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 60-455(d) does not violate federal constitutional protections; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence; and (3) Defendant's challenges to his sentence were unavailing. View "State v. Boysaw" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, holding that no error occurred in the conduct of Defendant's trial that required reversal. The State charged Defendant with one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child who was fourteen or more years of age but less than sixteen years of age. The State filed a motion seeking admission of evidence under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-455(d) that Defendant had been convicted of two sex crimes in Missouri. The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence was material and had probative value. The jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce the fact of his prior Missouri convictions for sex crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence; (2) section 60-455(d) does not violate the Bill of Rights contained in the Kansas Constitution; and (3) the record did not support Defendant's speedy trial claims. View "State v. Razzaq" on Justia Law

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In this appeal concerning the statutory definition of "idiopathic causes" contained in the statute excluding benefits for certain accidents or injuries the Supreme Court held that the Workers Compensation Appeals Board improperly denied benefits to Terrill Graber, who was injured when he fell down a workplace stairway, holding that there was not substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that the accident or injury arose directly or indirectly from an idiopathic cause under the statutory exclusion. There was no evidence presented in this case showing why Graber fell down the workplace stairway. The Board construed the term "idiopathic causes" in Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(f)(3)(A)(iv) broadly to cover all unknown causes and denied compensation. The court of appeals reversed after defining the term more narrowly. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration consistent with this opinion, holding that the term "idiopathic causes" in this context means medical conditions or medical events of unknown origin that are peculiar to the injured individual. View "Estate of Graber v. Dillon Companies" on Justia Law

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In this Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA) case, Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a01 et seq., the Supreme Court remanded Thomas Easterberg's action seeking a petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that there was a fact question for the district court to resolve in order to determine whether Easterberg's writ should be granted. Easterberg pled guilty to kidnapping and aggravated battery. On the sentencing guidelines journal entry of judgment for these convictions, the district court indicated that Easterberg's crimes were not sexually motivated for purposes of the Kansas Offender Registration Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4902(c)(14). Thereafter, the Attorney General's Office filed a petition seeking to involuntarily commit Easterberg as a sexually violent predator. Easterberg moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the State had no statutory basis to file the petition for his commitment. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Easterberg then filed this original action. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for a determination of whether the issue of sexual motivation was litigated in Easterberg's criminal case. If so, the State would be estopped from relegating that point in the KSVPA proceeding and Easterberg would not be eligible for involuntary commitment. If not, the KSVPA proceeding would continue. View "In re Care & Treatment of Easterberg" on Justia Law