Justia Kansas Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a late-night robbery in Topeka, Darren Johnson and an accomplice stole a car and fled the scene. Police officers were alerted and began searching for the suspects. Officer Scott spotted the stolen vehicle, activated his lights and sirens, and pursued Johnson, who accelerated and ran a red light to evade capture. After Officer Scott lost sight of the vehicle and turned off his lights and sirens, he continued driving in the same direction. Seconds later, another officer observed Johnson speeding before Johnson crashed into another vehicle, resulting in the death of a passenger in the stolen car.The State charged Johnson with felony murder, reckless second-degree murder, felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and aggravated robbery. The District Court of Shawnee County presided over the trial, where a jury convicted Johnson on all counts. At sentencing, the court merged the felony murder and reckless second-degree murder convictions and imposed a sentence of 25 years for felony murder, consecutive time for aggravated robbery, and other penalties, including restitution and attorney fees. Johnson appealed his convictions for felony murder and felony fleeing or attempting to elude, and the attorney fee order.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that the cessation of police lights and sirens during a chase does not, as a matter of law, end a police pursuit under the relevant statute; this is a fact question for the jury. The court found sufficient evidence supported both the felony fleeing or attempting to elude conviction and the underlying felony murder conviction. It ruled the failure to define “reckless driving” for the jury was not clearly erroneous and that “reckless driving” does not have a common meaning, requiring a definition. The court also affirmed the district court’s attorney fee order, concluding it was properly considered. Johnson’s convictions, sentence, and attorney fee order were affirmed. View "State v. Johnson " on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery after a 2014 home invasion. The prosecution's case largely depended on the testimony of three of the defendant’s coworkers, who described his role in the crime and recounted events before and after the incident. Physical evidence, including firearms and shell casings, was introduced at trial, but no physical evidence directly tied the defendant to the crime.After his conviction and unsuccessful direct appeal, the defendant filed a postconviction discovery motion requesting information to support a claim that a crime scene investigator (CSI) who had testified at trial had committed perjury in another proceeding. He argued that this alleged perjury was material and that the State’s failure to disclose it violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. The Wyandotte District Court denied the motion, reasoning that the CSI’s testimony was not material to the conviction because the verdict rested on witness testimony, not physical evidence. A subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment was also denied, with the court concluding the defendant could have presented his new arguments in his original motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the district court’s decisions for abuse of discretion. The court held that the defendant failed to show the requested discovery could have affected the outcome of his trial, as required under the standard articulated in State v. Mundo-Parra. The court further found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the motion to alter or amend. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "State v. Butler " on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance at a home shared by the defendant, his partner, and their children. During the incident, officers found a rifle in the living room. The defendant admitted ownership of the firearm and acknowledged he was on probation. Several months earlier, he had pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery, a conviction that, under Kansas law, prohibited him from possessing a firearm for five years. The defendant was charged with felony criminal use of a weapon for knowingly possessing a firearm within five years of his domestic violence conviction.In the Sedgwick District Court, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the statute prohibiting firearm possession by those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses violated the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and the defendant was convicted by a jury. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was constitutional and that sufficient evidence supported the verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case to address the Second Amendment challenge. The court held that the Kansas statute, which temporarily disarms individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses, is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court reasoned that early American laws, such as surety and “going armed” laws, allowed for the disarmament of individuals who posed a threat of violence, and that a recent conviction for domestic violence is sufficient to establish such a threat. The court concluded that the statute imposes a narrow, temporary restriction and is constitutional both on its face and as applied. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court. View "State v. McCray " on Justia Law

Three masked individuals, including the defendant and his brother, forcibly entered an occupied apartment in Wichita where marijuana was sold. The intruders demanded money, drugs, and guns. During the attempted robbery, one resident fired a warning shot through a bedroom door after the intruders tried to break in. As the intruders retreated, the defendant, who was armed, fired several shots, killing one resident and injuring another. Surveillance footage and witness testimony identified the defendant and his brother as participants, and physical evidence linked the defendant’s firearm to the fatal shot.A jury in the Sedgwick District Court convicted the defendant of felony murder committed during an attempted aggravated robbery, as well as other related offenses. The jury found him guilty as both a principal and, alternatively, as an aider and abettor. The district court denied posttrial motions and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and the propriety of a jury instruction regarding criminal responsibility for the acts of another. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the felony-murder conviction, finding that the killing occurred during the attempted aggravated robbery and that resistance by the occupants was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the armed intrusion. The court also determined that, although the jury instruction on responsibility for crimes of another was legally inappropriate under State v. Mora, the error did not amount to clear error because the defendant was charged and convicted as a principal, and the evidence established his specific intent. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Palmer " on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, each holding checking accounts with a bank, brought a class action lawsuit challenging the bank’s practices regarding overdraft fees. One plaintiff alleged that the bank breached its contract by charging multiple overdraft fees on transactions that did not initially overdraw the account but were later settled when the account was already overdrawn. The other plaintiff claimed a breach of contract when the bank charged multiple overdraft fees for repeated attempts to process a single payment that was returned for insufficient funds. Both plaintiffs sought to represent similarly situated customers.The Shawnee District Court granted the bank’s motion to dismiss, relying on a contract provision requiring customers to notify the bank of any “errors or improper charges” within 30 days of receiving their account statement. The court found this notice provision unambiguous and concluded that, because the plaintiffs did not provide timely notice, they were barred from bringing their claims. The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the term “improper charges” in the contract was ambiguous and that the district court improperly engaged in fact-finding at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court determined that whether the notice provision applied was a factual question and that the ambiguity should be construed against the bank as the contract’s drafter.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that the term “improper charges” was ambiguous. The Supreme Court went further, holding that this ambiguity must be construed against the bank, and as a matter of law, the notice provision did not apply to the overdraft fees at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Harding v. Capitol Federal Savings Bank " on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer in Jackson County, Kansas, observed a vehicle with a license plate that was slanting to the right and visibly moving, described as "flapping in the wind." The officer initiated a traffic stop based on the belief that the license plate was not securely fastened as required by Kansas law. During the stop, the officer discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and an open container of alcohol in the purse of a passenger, who initially provided a false name. The passenger was subsequently charged with several offenses, including possession of methamphetamine and transportation of liquor in an open container.The passenger moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle because the license plate was otherwise legible and visible. The Jackson District Court denied the motion, relying on the officer’s testimony and persuasive federal authority interpreting the relevant Kansas statute. The case proceeded to trial, where a jury convicted the passenger on all counts. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that under K.S.A. 8-133(c), a license plate must be securely fastened to the vehicle, in addition to being visible and legible. The court found that the officer’s observation of the plate hanging askew and moving provided reasonable suspicion of a statutory violation, justifying the traffic stop. The court affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the district court, holding that the stop was lawful and the evidence was properly admitted. View "State v. Yeargin-Charles " on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Geary County, Kansas, stopped a vehicle driven by Brian Beck after observing that a license plate frame partially obscured the state name on the plate. Beck was not committing any driving infractions. During the stop, Beck appeared nervous and gave an unusual explanation for his travel route. A canine unit was called, and after the dog alerted, Beck consented to a search of his car, which led to the discovery of over two pounds of methamphetamine. Beck was charged with possession with intent to distribute, possession without a drug tax stamp, and interference with law enforcement. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, but the Geary District Court denied the motion. At trial, Beck renewed his objection, which was again overruled, and a jury convicted him on all counts.On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the partial obstruction of the state name justified the stop under Kansas law, specifically K.S.A. 8-133, which requires license plates to be “clearly visible” and “clearly legible.” The appellate panel reasoned that covering half of the state name violated the statute, regardless of whether the plate could otherwise be identified.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed only the statutory interpretation issue. It held that Kansas law does not require the state name to be clearly legible on license plates, except as it appears on registration decals. The court found that the lower courts had misapplied the statute by treating the obscured state name as a violation. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the district court and the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation of the statute. View "State v. Beck " on Justia Law

A prospective employee applied for a position as an occupational therapist with a rehabilitation company, which required COVID-19 vaccination as a condition of employment. The applicant requested a religious exemption, submitting a written statement and a supporting letter from a friend citing religious objections to vaccines developed with fetal cell lines. The company questioned the applicant about her vaccination history and, finding her responses insufficiently sincere, denied the exemption and rescinded the job offer. The applicant filed a complaint with the Kansas Department of Labor, which found the company had violated Kansas law by inquiring into the sincerity of her religious beliefs.The company sought judicial review in the Johnson District Court, which reversed the agency’s decision. The district court held that the relevant Kansas statute, which prohibits employers from inquiring into the sincerity of an employee’s religious beliefs when considering COVID-19 vaccine exemptions, was preempted by federal law—specifically, the federal Vaccine Mandate for Medicare and Medicaid providers and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court also found the Kansas statute violated due process because it lacked a rational basis.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the federal Vaccine Mandate and Title VII do not expressly or impliedly preempt the Kansas statute, because federal law permits but does not require employers to inquire into religious sincerity. The court further held that the Kansas law does not violate due process, as it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting religious liberty and provides adequate procedural protections. The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Powerback Rehabilitation v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who murdered his girlfriend and their four-year-old daughter in their home. After committing the murders, he disposed of the bodies in separate locations, attempted to clean the crime scene, and then falsely reported the victims as missing to the police. Initially charged with capital murder, the defendant ultimately entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two counts each of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping. The plea allowed both parties to argue sentencing, present evidence of aggravation, and permitted the court to decide whether sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.The District Court of Ford County, Kansas, after considering testimony, victim impact statements, and other evidence, imposed consecutive hard 25-year sentences for the felony murders, with the aggravated kidnapping sentences to run concurrently. The court also assessed mandatory fees and stated its intent to waive any nonmandatory fees. However, the sentencing journal entry included both a domestic violence special program fee and a DNA database fee. The defendant appealed, arguing that the consecutive sentences were an abuse of discretion and that the nonmandatory fees were improperly imposed.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences, as the decision was reasonable given the aggravating circumstances. The court found that the domestic violence special program fee was erroneously imposed contrary to the court’s stated intent and must be vacated. The court also held that the domestic violence designation was supported by the record, but the required domestic violence assessment was not ordered and must be addressed on remand. The assessment of the DNA database fee was affirmed, as there was no specific finding of indigency. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions. View "State v. Peterson " on Justia Law

The defendant killed his wife in the early morning hours after violating a protective order that required him to stay away from her residence. He had consumed a significant amount of alcohol throughout the previous day and provided conflicting accounts of the events leading to the killing, initially telling police he acted out of spite and “blacked out,” and later testifying at trial that the stabbing was accidental during a struggle. Forensic evidence showed multiple stab wounds and no signs of a struggle. After the killing, the defendant disposed of the body and took steps to prevent the children from seeing the scene.The State charged the defendant in the Riley District Court with premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and violation of a protective order. At trial, the defendant requested jury instructions on voluntary intoxication and lesser included offenses of reckless homicide, which the district court denied. The jury convicted him on all counts. At sentencing, the district court pronounced sentences for the non-murder counts but failed to pronounce a sentence for the premeditated first-degree murder conviction. The defendant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, raising issues regarding jury instructions, prosecutorial error, and sentencing.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas held that the district court erred by failing to give a voluntary intoxication instruction and by not considering the minimum evidence required for such an instruction. The court also found error in the prosecutor’s use of “we know” statements regarding contested facts. However, the court concluded that these errors, considered cumulatively, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial given the overwhelming evidence of premeditation and intent. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case to the district court to pronounce a sentence for the premeditated first-degree murder conviction. View "State v. Bobian " on Justia Law